The Berlin Pulse
Rethinking Security for Germany and Europe

With contributions by Jens Stoltenberg, Roberta Metsola, Fiona Hill, Jacek Czaputowicz

Körber Stiftung
Dear Readers,

Welcome to the sixth edition of The Berlin Pulse! While we launched this publication in 2017 to promote a debate on Germany’s international role, now more than ever it is relevant to juxtapose international expectations of Germany with German public opinion. Against the background of the Zeitenwende proclaimed by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, our survey results are even more intriguing and important than before.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine made it clear that a peaceful Europe and a stable European security order are not a given but a fragile condition for which we need to work continuously.

Thanks to our editor, Julia Ganter, this edition of The Berlin Pulse assembles different perspectives from Europe and beyond. They all share the objective of rethinking security for Germany and Europe, in particular finding answers to two most pressing questions: How to reinstall stability and freedom in Europe? And, since energy policy is decisive for security, how to prepare for the energy transition?

Contributors to The Berlin Pulse have never been so critical of Germany. The German public may have sensed this feeling as 4 in 10 of our survey respondents say Germany’s international image has deteriorated since the invasion of Ukraine. Thanks to our partner, the Pew Research Center, we know that most American respondents still view relations with Germany positively, however, and German ones reciprocate this. This is a good signal as current and future security challenges can be tackled only with allies. Most German respondents are willing to meet at least one international expectation of the country: 60 per cent say durably investing more in defence is the right thing to do.

Past strategic mistakes cannot be erased, but Germany can learn from them. The public seems ready to do so. For example, 66 per cent of respondents say that Berlin should reduce economic dependencies on China and even accept economic losses – a position clearly not shared with all policymakers and private-sector leaders.

With a diplomatic solution to end Russia’s war in Ukraine currently out of reach – and while contributors such as Roberta Metsola, Jacek Czaputowicz, Svitlana Zalishchuk and Claude-France Arnould expect Germany to ‘walk the talk’ – 65 per cent of German respondents still want their country’s stronger international engagement to be diplomatic rather than military or financial.

The Berlin Pulse once again sheds light on several gaps that need to be bridged and offers plenty to debate. Enjoy reading and rethinking security with us on the following pages!

Thomas Paulsen
Member of the Executive Board, Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg

October 2022
The Berlin Pulse Survey 2022/2023

A representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy commissioned by Körber-Stiftung

- 90% say that Germany does not need its own nuclear weapons to guarantee its security.
- 82% rate the US-German relationship as very good or good.
- 80% are very strongly, strongly or a little concerned about an extension of the war onto NATO territory.
- 66% want Germany to reduce its economic dependencies on China, even if this leads to economic losses.
- 55% say that Germany should purchase energy supplies from all countries, not only democratic ones.
- 52% say Germany should continue practising restraint when facing international crises.
- 36% see the United States as Germany’s most important partner.
- 32% see France as Germany’s most important partner.
- 14% of Germans in favour of stronger international engagement prefer stronger military engagement.
- 39% assume that Germany’s reputation among its partners has worsened since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine.
- 45% of responses refer to the war in Ukraine as the greatest challenge facing German foreign policy.

The Berlin Pulse Survey 2022/2023 is a representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy commissioned by Körber-Stiftung.
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Civilian Power in Transformation

Germany’s Zeitenwende could mark the end of its foreign policy tradition, and the public’s scepticism should be seen as a facilitator for a German leadership role

Germany might be seen internationally as a model country on several levels. However, it does not have a reputation for proactive foreign policymaking or great strategic thinking. After the end of the Second World War, the only proper way for Germany to proceed internationally was as a civilian power with two dominating guiding principles: a commitment to multilateralism and military restraint. As The Berlin Pulse survey results show since 2017, a cautious peace-oriented culture is also deeply anchored in German public opinion.

But, while Germany was becoming Europe’s economic powerhouse, international expectations of its role in the world started to grow. Despite the increasing demands by partners for it to assume more responsibility internationally and for European security, however, Berlin stuck to its course – until 24 February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine.

Three days later, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced major shifts in Germany’s foreign and security policy: a special fund of €100 billion for the Bundeswehr, annual investments of more than 2 per cent of GDP for defence, weapon supplies for Ukraine and further sanctions against Russia. This was a remarkable mix of responses for a coalition government consisting of – in theory – pacifist greens, frugal liberals and Russia-empathizing social democrats.

What initially seemed like a complete foreign policy U-turn at the speed of light is – not surprisingly – taking time to be realized. When the government finally managed to send rocket launchers to Ukraine, a real milestone given Germany’s legal barrier to exporting to war zones, European partners and Western allies applauded. However, the confidence in Germany’s reliability still rests on shaky ground – especially from the perspective of Eastern European and Baltic countries. The U-turn in public opinion was quicker. In March, 67 per cent of the usually restrained Germans were in favour of the country being involved in international crises, and months after the beginning of the invasion a majority still supports the delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine.

This leads to two crucial questions. First, will the public support what could become a new foreign and security policy course in the long term? Second, does the Zeitenwende mark the end of Germany’s tradition as civilian power and the beginning of a more militarily engaged country?

The latest survey results of The Berlin Pulse provide an answer to the first question: The change in public opinion shortly after the invasion of Ukraine has not been sustained. Regarding their country’s international role, most Germans are reluctant. Only 41 per cent say they are in favour of stronger engagement, and within this group 65 per cent prefer diplomatic over military (14 per cent) or financial (33 per cent) means. This fits the position that seven out of ten Germans do not want their country to assume a military leadership role in Europe, and that nine out of ten oppose the view that Germany needs its own nuclear weapons to guarantee its security.

Contrary to what Chancellor Scholz said in his Bundestag speech in February – ‘when something finds a broad consensus among politicians and the public, it will endure’ – the Zeitenwende seems to be ill-fated. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that Germans are against anything that involves a military component as 60 per cent say that durably investing more in defence is the right thing to do. One explanation for these, at first sight, contradictory positions could be that Germans assess their country’s current military capacities realistically and therefore prefer to invest first before increasing military engagement, not to mention taking over any kind of military leadership role. This could also be understood as a positive signal about long-term public support for Germany’s changing foreign and security policy course.

Contrary to what the German public needs to understand that a more militarized Germany will also lead to a more secure Europe, one should rather embrace its scepticism and reframe it as a strength for foreign policymaking. Could there be a better leading military power in Europe than one that can rely on its public as a critical supervisory body? From an international perspective, Germany’s recent defence policy decisions are simply about catching up with the status quo. From a domestic perspective, however, they are a remarkable development.

The time of Germany being the epitome of a civilian power is over. When rethinking security, Berlin must therefore focus on two aspects. First, creating a sustainable foreign and defence policy approach that is compatible with the country Germany has become and that matches international expectations. The coming national security strategy must meet these requirements. Second, policymakers must ‘spring clean’ foreign policy: throw past mistakes overboard, such as the assumption of ‘change through trade’, but keep what was a German strength in the past. One example is the capacity to build trustworthy relationships due a multifaceted international presence, consisting of crisis prevention, development cooperation, foreign cultural policy, and – last but not least – diplomacy.
Russia’s attack on Ukraine was a watershed moment for European security. A new consensus emerged almost overnight: Security in Europe will no longer be possible with Russia but only against it. Germany’s government has called these developments a Zeitenwende and announced major investments in the armed forces. According to Claude-France Arnould, these have the potential to ‘redefine the balance in Europe and the responsibilities involved’. Germany seems finally to have assumed the leadership role in security and defence that its neighbours have wanted. But it will be a rocky road: Jacek Czaputowicz argues in this section that Germany’s military support for Ukraine so far justifies scepticism – the reason why Poland and other Central European states rely more on the United Kingdom and the United States than on Germany. And, indeed, The Berlin Pulse survey confirms that 78 per cent of Germans prefer financial and humanitarian instruments to military ones.

Germany has also announced an increased presence in the Baltic states and more engagement in NATO. But Laima Andrikienė draws the bitter lesson that alarm-raising calls about Russia’s real intentions were only heard by few leaders in Europe and the United States. Finland and Sweden joining NATO will improve the security situation of the Baltic states, as Finland’s Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto underlines – and most Germans support their membership. NATO will emerge stronger than it was before the war. But what remains of the European Union’s defence ambitions in this picture? According to Roberta Metsola, a new European defence policy would not offer an alternative but an addition to NATO. Thomas Greminger argues that it is ‘not too soon to start thinking about how to improve relations with Russia, and about rebuilding security in post-war Europe’ – a position not shared by Svitlana Zalishchuk, who argues that the war cannot be concluded on the diplomatic level.

The to-do list for European security is long and does not end with Russia. A fundamental question for Berlin is how to approach Germany’s and Europe’s dependency on China. Is Germany repeating the same mistakes of its past Russia policy? According to The Berlin Pulse, Germans do not perceive China as a military threat. Nevertheless, most of them support reducing dependencies on China, even if this leads to economic losses. The position of Global South countries towards Russia is also more ambiguous than expected. As Priyanka Chaturvedi argues, India’s foreign policy is not based on siding with a power axis. For Germans, the priorities for the coming years are clear: The war in Ukraine, energy, as well as climate and the environment. Tackling these will require global partnerships.
A Real Security and Defence Union

Precisely because the EU is a values-based project, it must strengthen its security capabilities. A call for action

By Roberta Metsola

The world is changing faster than many thought possible. Vladimir Putin’s tanks rolling into Ukraine on 24 February 2022 meant that the geopolitical sands shifted in Europe and the rest of the world. On the one hand, the Kremlin’s threat to our peace has united us and has given us the courage to stand up for the values-based project that the European Union was always meant to be. On the other hand, it made us realize that peace and democracy is not a given and that our security architecture is at stake.

This crisis has required our union to take unprecedented and decisive steps to reduce our dependencies and to strengthen our strategic autonomy and resilience. The Versailles Declaration of March 2022, issued by EU leaders in response to the Russian invasion, not only confirmed that we have to be more responsible for our own security, but that we also need greater capacity to act autonomously. This war on our continent has accentuated the need to create a real European Security and Defence Union.

Structural obstacles have weakened European defence through the years

Fortunately, many of the building blocks are already in place. The EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence together with the Defence Investment Gap Analysis make up a solid basis to fortify our security and defence architecture by 2030. Increased defence spending and collaborative investments will target structural obstacles, such as defence underinvestment and industrial as well as capability gaps, that have persistently weakened European defence through the years, and that have been highlighted in the current context.

However, it remains imperative that we implement urgent actions to strengthen European defence in the immediate term. Establishing an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5,000 troops, facilitating live exercises on land and sea, enhancing military mobility in Europe and beyond, designing stronger crisis-management missions and operations, and developing more rapid and flexible decision-making processes are all steps in the right direction.

Notwithstanding the slow start and uneven speed of delivery by certain member states, the EU has been able to provide unprecedented support to Ukraine, amounting by August 2022 to some €2.5 billion worth of lethal defensive military equipment, in addition to the development of an EU training mission for the Ukrainian military forces. However, this has resulted in a pressing need for member states to replenish their stocks of key military capacities. To this effect, it is important to emphasize that improving coordination on defence procurement is critical to addressing capability gaps. This will require us to work with the European defence industry.

EU member states need to replenish their military stocks

Furthermore, it will be imperative that we take a holistic approach. We have done well to ban Kremlin propaganda tools. Yet, we know that Russia continues to weaponize information and to push disinformation and misinformation. Therefore, strengthening European military-related capabilities must be topped up with EU ability to react and counter malign influence, as well as to respond to Russia’s attempts to weaponize basic commodities. Our focus on building stronger capabilities should span the entire spectrum – air, maritime, land, space, cyber defence, energy, food and military mobility.

If we want to create a real European Security and Defence Union, it is crucial that member states – including Germany – are on the same page. Implementing Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s pledge to increase Germany’s defence budget to 2 per cent of GDP and to invest €100 billion in defence procurement would be a significant boost to the objectives of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity.

We need to act with coherence and a common sense of purpose

I am proud of our union’s strong response to Putin’s unprovoked and unjustified war in Ukraine. By adopting several packages of hard-hitting sanctions against Russia in record speed, we know that Putin and his allies are already starting to feel the heat. And yet, more still needs to be done. The EU has no choice but to quickly learn the lessons of this terrible war. In assessing our strategic environment, we need to act in unison – with greater coherence and a common sense of purpose. Our reinforced ways and means will improve our collective ability to safeguard life in Europe as we know it and will ensure that our union remains a global champion of multilateralism. For the European Parliament this is not a question, it is a necessity and a call for action. We have no choice but to step up.

Should Germany play a military leadership role in Europe?

29% Rather yes

68% Rather no

2022: don’t know 2%, no answer 1%
Former government advisor and activist Svitlana Zalishchuk on women in war, Europe’s failed Russia policy and hopes for a post-war Ukraine

Körber-Stiftung: Ukraine’s civil society is seen by many as the driving force for the reforms that happened since the Euromaidan protest in 2013 and 2014. What role does it play in the war? Svitlana Zalishchuk: I think there would not have been such mobilization and capacity for territorial defence now without this experience during Euromaidan. US intelligence predicted that Russia would take over Ukraine in three days. It did not happen thanks to the resistance of the Ukrainian army. But we cannot underestimate the role of people on the ground who immediately joined the military forces or organized territorial defence units.

So, the involvement of civil society is mainly about support for the military forces? The support also focuses on logistics, food supply and other humanitarian aspects. For example, to ensure that the internet is working so people can communicate. This was a matter of survival. We often think about NGOs and analytical work when we say civil society, but the war shows that it basically means the responsibility you take as a citizen to make sure that your country is stable, secure and going into the right direction.

What is the role of women in the war? More than a million men went to fight on the front line. This means that the responsibility to take care of family and household rests on women alone. In addition, many women volunteer to deliver food, humanitarian assistance and medication, or to help to produce special goods needed by the army. Also, many women who had to flee engage with governments, parliaments, local civil society organizations and media outside the country. They are civilian ambassadors to put Ukraine high on the international agenda, to counteract fake news and Russian propaganda, and to keep our partners informed and engaged.

What factors are crucial for Ukraine to win this war, apart from arms deliveries? Arms deliveries! This war cannot be won in the information sphere or diplomatically. There will be negotiations sooner or later, but the war will be resolved on the battleground. And the quantity of weapons and military equipment as well as the speed of their delivery is crucial. A second factor is unity on sanctions. I disagree that sanctions are not working. Russia’s economy is suffering. And sooner or later this will pressure the government to negotiate because it will have to say something to Russia’s people. A third important factor is that Ukraine ranks high on the international agenda. This war is neo-colonial and should trigger solidarity and understanding, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but we have been less successful in finding allies there than in the democratic West.

What should Germany do differently in its energy policy, considering past mistakes? First, Germany has to deal with immediate challenges, such as the upcoming winter. It will be a very tough one for Europe with the deficit of gas, unprecedented high prices for energy and the threat of the energy issue dividing countries. Diversification and saving energy are two measures as well as ensuring the support of the public to go through this winter securely. And Germany must delay the implementation of its climate-neutrality policy. It must take a step back to deal with the current situation.

And after the winter? Investing as much as possible in renewables to ensure self-sufficiency and to stop filling Russia’s budget. At the moment, Europeans are paying twice. First, for their energy and then to support the Ukrainian government, which is currently not able to cover all its expenses.

Would you say that the image of Germany has changed in Ukraine since the invasion? Since the beginning of the war, we are seeing a change of the German position on several fronts. Ukrainians appreciate this. At the same time, I think that Ukrainian society feels that there is not enough leadership coming from Germany, one of the strongest countries in the world. Berlin delayed the fulfillment of several promises, especially regarding the delivery of heavy weapons. In the end, this is one of the historic moments when leaders will be judged not only on what they have done, but also on what they have not.

You promoted the vision of a new Ukraine as an activist during Euromaidan. What are your hopes for a post-war Ukraine? First, our hope is that the war will be over as soon as possible and that people stop dying. Seeing all the atrocities leads to a trauma incurable for decades. About the destiny of the country, hopes have not changed much. Ninety per cent of the population want to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community, and we believe that we deserve to join the EU and NATO. Ukraine has emerging-country potential, especially in agriculture but also information technology. To make use of it, we need our human capital back. Since the invasion one-fifth of Ukrainians have left the country.

The EU accession process can take decades. Why was it still an important step to get candidate status now? It is a very symbolic act for us. We feel that we are dying but that there is a perspective for our children. We are fighting for something very valuable. We will not be some buffer state between Europe and Russia but part of the European community.
Europe must start thinking now about a new security order and its relations with Russia

By Thomas Greminger

The world as we know it has been turned upside down. The COVID-19 pandemic, the storming of the US Capitol and the war in Ukraine have shattered our assumptions and made the unthinkable possible. We are witnessing an inflection point in world history – a Zeitewende. Now is not the time for business as usual. And yet, there is a dearth of fresh thinking. If we are to manage current crises and be prepared for those on the horizon, it is time for greater solidarity, cooperation and, especially, for innovation.

International relations are becoming more problematic, with autocracies versus democracies, Russia versus the West and the United States against China. Yet, many of the challenges that affect national security come from non-state actors or transnational threats such as pandemics, cyberattacks, transnational crime or climate change. There are no military solutions to these problems; nor can states deal with them on their own. Therefore, cooperation is self-interest.

But at the moment, geopolitics trumps solidarity. Russia and the West each seems to think that it can win the war in Ukraine, that time is on its side and that the stakes are too high to back down. This can create a bloody protracted conflict, a spillover of the war into other parts of Europe, or a game of chicken with nuclear weapons. What do these three scenarios all have in common? No peace in sight. Is there still room for cooperation between Russia and the West? Some analysts have suggested that a new European security architecture could be constructed through a series of inclusive consultations such as the Helsinki process in the 1970s. The problem with the Helsinki 2.0 idea is that – unlike then – neither side is in the mood for détente, and there are few bridge-builders to broker consensus.

Precisely in times of crisis one needs a strategy

As a result, most pundits say that we can only talk about peace when the war is over. This logic – albeit understandable – risks paralysing institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). If the war means no business as usual, there can be no cooperation until there is peace. This means no business at all in the interim.

What is the alternative? There are currently two simultaneous crises going on in Europe: a war between Russia and Ukraine triggered by President Vladimir Putin’s invasion and a conflict between Russia and the West to prepare for the day the war in Ukraine ends? We do not know when and how this will happen, but it will end eventually, and a security order will then have to be restored in Europe.

Therefore, it is not too soon to start thinking about how to improve relations between Russia and the West, and about rebuilding security in post-war Europe. It is precisely in times of crisis that one needs a strategy. It is worth recalling that planning for a new international organization – which would eventually become the United Nations – started in 1943 during the dark days of the Second World War. In addition to taking steps to end the war in Ukraine, it is time to start thinking about what a new European security order would look like.

At a minimum, we should try to hang on to what we have as existing OSCE principles and commitments are not formally questioned by anybody and therefore would be hard to recreate. However, it would be cynical to simply reaffirm them under the existing circumstances. Therefore, OSCE states should discuss how they understand these principles today, look at how existing commitments can be implemented more effectively and consider the need for new guidelines. This is especially important for issues such as cybersecurity, climate change and the impact of technology on security and human rights. Germany has traditionally been a strong advocate of cooperative security and the OSCE, which is why substantial German engagement on these issues could be expected.

We need a new narrative for the European security space

Arms control as well as confidence- and security-building measures will have to be key pillars of rebuilding trust. Here the OSCE experience and toolbox can be helpful. Steps should also be taken to create opportunities for military-to-military contacts. There is less interaction between NATO and Russian commanders today than during the Cold War. We will also need a new narrative to describe the European security space. Will countries of Europe still consider their security as indivisible? Or will there be a new dividing line between Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security spheres? Will the European security architecture be inclusive or have different layers of cooperation: core principles and commitments, but other areas of cooperation that states opt in or out of? The latter would create a patchwork of cooperation in which interests converge and guardrails exist to manage relations when interests collide.

Russia de facto has a place in Europe

The ultimate question is what place would Russia have in a pan-European security structure. On the one hand, it will be hard to trust Russia after the political and physical damage it has done to Ukraine as well as to basic norms and principles of international law. On the other hand, Russia will not disappear as a country. It de facto has a place in Europe, even if it were to be shut out of European security organizations. One way or the other, ways will have to be found to interact with Moscow.

There is no appetite now to discuss such issues within European security organizations. As a result, it would be more prudent to test ideas in Track 1.5 processes involving experts and representatives of states who are willing to contemplate ‘business unusual’, albeit with a degree of deniability. As in the 1970s and 1980s, it is also vital to engage civil society, which can exert pressure from the bottom up in closed societies where no change can be expected from the top.

In short, as dire and dangerous as the current situation is, we need to think and plan for a better future. In addition to ending the war, we need to plan for the day after.

Thomas Greminger is director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and was secretary general of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from 2017 to 2020.

What is more important for Germany…?

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2022: don’t know 3%, no answer 2% | 2021: don’t know 3%, no answer 2%
This year has seen profound changes in the security environment of Finland and Europe. Russia has shown it is willing to accept extremely large risks to advance its geopolitical objectives. Its actions have directly caused the security situation in Europe to become more volatile and unforeseeable. Distrust will remain even when Russia eventually ceases its military aggression against Ukraine. Its unjustified and unprovoked invasion and the ongoing war have shaken the very foundations of the European rules-based security order. This has forced Finland to re-evaluate its approach to European security. Until February, a combination of a strong national defence capability, close partnership with NATO and a network of bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation arrangements served Finland well. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the equation, however. Finnish public opinion shifted in support of NATO membership. A thorough assessment of the rapidly unfolding changes in our security environment paved the way for the historical decision to apply to join the alliance.

The changes that Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called a Zeitenwende in the context of Germany’s security and defence policy have not been as sharp in the case of Finland as they may seem at first glance. There are at least three aspects to this. First, Finland long ago chose its place. We have been part of the European Union since 1995 and a NATO partner since 1994. Since 2004, successive governments have included in their security and defence policy white papers that Finland retains the option to apply for full membership in the alliance. Second, due to history and geographical location, Finns are security-oriented and we have a concrete approach to security issues. There is a strong will to defend the country, and Finland’s preparedness model builds on the concept of comprehensive security in which vital societal functions are handled jointly by the authorities, businesses, NGOs and citizens. Finland has a 1,300-kilometre land border with Russia, more than all other EU countries combined. We are used to taking a long-term perspective in analysing Russia.

Third, since the end of the Second World War, Finland has maintained a high level of military preparedness through national conscription, which gives us a mobilization strength of 280,000 soldiers and 900,000 trained reservists – a remarkable force for a nation of only 5.5 million people. In a poll by the Advisory Board of Defence Information published in May, 83 per cent of respondents stated that Finland should be defended militarily against an attack even if the outcome seemed uncertain. This willingness, together with our model of comprehensive security will make Finland a resilient NATO member. Finland will continue to oversee its own defence, but membership of the alliance will provide us with security guarantees as well as more opportunities for cooperation and participation in decision-making on key security issues.

We are about to join NATO at the same time as our closest bilateral partner and neighbour, Sweden, a country in which the principle of military non-alignment has been historically very significant. This will provide new opportunities also for broader Nordic cooperation. Finland and Sweden are security providers; as NATO members, we will strengthen the security of the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe as well as of the entire transatlantic alliance. This will raise the threshold for an aggressor to use military force in these areas. EU member states have taken firm action in support of Ukraine following Russia’s aggression. Re-evaluating existing national policies, as in Finland and Germany, has enabled common decisions to be made in record time. One example from Finland is that we quickly reversed our previous policy not to supply defence material to war zones. We should also use this moment of re-evaluation to broaden our security concept, especially when it comes to climate change and its impact on security policy. For Finland, the Arctic is of key concern in this regard as the impacts of climate change are felt faster there than anywhere else in the world. In addition, the rules-based international order is as much at stake in cyberspace as in the physical world. As a NATO member, Finland will, along with the other Nordic countries, continue to defend this order and multilateralism. We will also continue to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the very foundations for peaceful societies.

Russia’s aggression spurred decision-making in record time. There will be a need to build confidence after the active hostilities in Ukraine have ceased. Eventually, when Russian behaviour permits, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe will be well placed to serve as a forum for these discussions. I am confident that, with the adjustments in Finland’s policies and Germany’s Zeitenwende, we will be stronger and better able to concentrate our efforts to support Ukraine and work together for a safer and more secure Europe.

Pekka Haavisto is the minister for foreign affairs of Finland.

**Do you approve or disapprove of Finland and Sweden potentially becoming NATO members?**

**German respondents:**
- Approve: 75%
- Disapprove: 16%
- Neither approve nor disapprove: 7%

**US respondents:**
- Approve: 60%
- Disapprove: 33%
- Neither approve nor disapprove: 5%
Get the Engine Running for European Security

Germany’s and France’s national security strategies must follow common main lines to promote a full-spectrum European security strategy

By Claude-France Arnould

I remember Joschka Fischer, years before he became minister for foreign affairs, asking: ‘Why should Germany have a foreign policy? Nobody wants Germany to have a foreign policy!’ Later, he nevertheless took decisions regarding his country’s military involvement in the Balkans, which were a first significant rupture from previous German restraint. Today, facing the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and with a coalition government dominated by the Social Democratic Party and The Greens, Germany has decided to export weapons to a country at war, to immediately ring-fence €100 billion for the Bundeswehr and to commit to a future defence budget of ‘more than 2 per cent of German GDP’. If these commitments are confirmed, Germany will have the largest military budget in the European Union, significantly ahead of France; these figures redefine the balance in Europe and the responsibilities involved. There is, therefore, no doubt that Germany needs not only a foreign policy, but also a security strategy.

If we, Germans and French, agree to make our European interests and way of life. To that end, we need-capacities and supporting industry. We need a strong defence industry in the EU to support his budget. His answer was short and candid: ‘Jobs in Seattle’. We also need a strong defence industry in the EU, and we need to open markets for it, internal and foreign, ideally based on sound partnerships.

Through increased defence spending in Europe, we can create the conditions to secure our interests and peace, if present commitments are implemented. But it will happen only if we avoid two pitfalls. First, buying massively ‘off the shelf’ and, second, opting for the national path. Of course, buying off the shelf is not excluded, particularly for immediate requirements or for specific purposes. But the ‘shelf’ can also be European. Europe must prepare for future developments with the appropriate freedom of action, whether it is called strategic autonomy or Selbsthandlungsfähigkeit. France and Germany are working on major projects for the future; the Future Combat Air System is the most emblematic as well as the most problematic. Cooperation on this program, as well as on land and space assets, should be a compelling priority and be housed in EU structures, such as the EDA, to ring-fence the commitments and involve other willing participants. That is why I am convinced that the Zeitenwende in German security and defence policy must bring a resolute commitment to using the EU framework. Technologies are increasingly dual, be it space, cyber or artificial intelligence. The EU brings the incentive of its budget; synergies with research, maritime, transport, and energy policies; and the regulatory ability to control the use of these technologies. But above all, the EU framework confers political legitimacy and solidarity. It should demonstrate that it is not only compatible with efficiency but also a precondition for efficiency. We should have a direct dialogue with the United States to alleviate any doubt on the complementarity of EU action on defence with the transatlantic alliance. Last year, US President Joe Biden already expressed clear support for European efforts in building capabilities.

We need a strong defence industry in the EU

The French and German strategies should also aim at preserving the original design for building European security strategy.

Germany’s and France’s national security strategies must follow common main lines to promote a full-spectrum European security strategy

Which country currently is the most important partner for Germany?

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2022: don’t know 17%, no answer 4%

Restoring Stability and Freedom in Europe
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a fundamental rise in defence spending and the decision to freeze the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. These steps were a response not only to Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine but also to an increased threat perception in German society. The question is whether Germany has been late with these decisions. Would Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s calculations of potential gains and losses have been the same if Germany had not implemented its energy projects with Russia? Would there be war in Ukraine at all?

Ukrainians fight simultaneously for their independence and European security

For Poland, helping Ukraine is an obligation arising from international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, as well as an ethical obligation stemming from European values. Germany, however, does not see this obligation as clearly. It claims it is a reliable and trustworthy ally. The best way of doing so would be to take the lead in supporting Ukraine with military equipment.

Polish concerns about Germany’s reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are not restricted to government circles. For example, one article in the impartial daily Rzeczpospolita argues that the increase in Germany’s spending on armaments may be a problem because trust in Germany decreased dramatically since the invasion. The author also asks a key question: Does Germany really want ‘Russia to cease to be a military threat in the future’? Germany’s support for Ukraine should be in accordance with its economic and military potential – manifested in the quantity, quality and speed of delivery of weapons necessary to repel Russia’s aggression. In the opinion of Poland and other Central European states, especially those bordering Russia, the threat from the Kremlin to the international order is so serious that only Western unity, led by the United States, can counter it. They expect Germany to pursue a policy aimed at maintaining this kind of unity. This is not the time for a separate European way of resolving the conflict or shaping relations with Russia, especially as Putin perceives the United States as Russia’s main enemy and Western European countries as potential allies.

Germany’s eventual independence from Russian energy could lead to a more decisive policy towards Moscow. But, as geopolitical and historic considerations will remain, it is unclear if such a shift is going to take place. In German political culture, Russia is seen as a vital link for the European security system. This thinking dates back to the 19th century Concert of Europe and the existence of spheres of influence that should be respected.

Today, German politicians rarely use an explicit language of geopolitics or spheres of influence. President Frank-Walter Steinmeier long preferred to speak of Russia’s indispensable place in the new security architecture. The meaning, however, is the same: Russia’s security interests – also regarding Ukraine – should be respected, and Russia must be allowed to save face. Steinmeier has since admitted he was mistaken about Russia policy, but the proof of a permanent change in German policy would not be words but deeds such as military support for Ukraine and stricter sanctions on Russia.

Could there still be a common path for Germany and Poland to reconstruct European security? From the German perspective, Poland appears to be a difficult partner that takes the lead in criticizing and making demands of Germany, including for reparations from the Second World War, and not always in a diplomatic manner.

Germany and Poland also differ in their perception of the United States’ role in Europe. Berlin wants to maintain the European Union’s good and open relationship with the United States, while Warsaw wants to keep the United States in Europe.

To reconstruct European security, Berlin needs to send clear signals to Russia and join forces with Poland and France

By Jacek Czaputowicz

Restoring Stability and Freedom in Europe
Poland and other Central European states care about the US military presence in Europe, especially on the eastern flank of NATO. In these countries, there is a conviction that, in view of Russia’s aggression, only the United States can ensure their security. This makes Washington a European actor from their perspective. In Germany, the United States is rather perceived as one of many external partners, such as Russia and China, although one closer in terms of values.

The Weimar Triangle could send a clear signal to Putin

While Germans criticized US policy during the presidency of Donald Trump, most Poles look back on it positively for various reasons. First, Russia presidency of Joe Biden. Second, Trump expressed strong opposition to the Nord Stream 2 project, which increased German and European energy dependence on Russia. Third, Trump’s calls for an increase in Germany’s military spending to the 2 per cent of GDP target set by NATO were, as we can see today, fully justified. Above all, Poles appreciated the increased US military presence in their country, which they perceive as a guarantor of its security.

Poland’s strong criticism of Russia, closer relations with the United States, pro-US position on many international issues and aspirations for an independent policy in the region, as attempted with the Three Seas Initiative (which was created without the participation of Germany) appear in Berlin as contrary to its long-term interests. The differences between Germany and Poland can be bridged only by taking into consideration each other’s expectations.

In such a situation, does the Weimar Triangle of the two countries plus France have a chance to regain its role? The visit of Scholz alongside France’s President Emmanuel Macron, Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Romania’s President Klaus Iohannis to Kyiv in June 2022 demonstrated that the Weimar Triangle has not been playing any role in the war. However, pragmatic cooperation in international politics remains in the strategic interest of Germany and Poland despite current tensions. A meeting between the foreign ministers of the Weimar countries plus Ukraine would have a symbolic meaning and may bring the format to life. It would demonstrate that Ukraine is treated as an equal partner and would send a clear signal to Russia. It may also be a means to improve relations among France, Germany and Poland.

Is such an initiative feasible? We will only know if we try.

Jack Czaputowicz is professor at the University of Warsaw and was Poland’s minister of foreign affairs from 2018 to 2020.

Körber-Stiftung: You have studied President Vladimir Putin for decades. Why does the invasion of Ukraine at this particular moment make sense from his perspective?

Fiona Hill: I am pretty confident that Putin thought in February 2022 that he was to engage in a special military operation, not in a full-blown war. The operation was modelled on the Soviet Cold War interventions in Warsaw Pact countries that got out of line. Putin was thinking of Ukraine more on the lines of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Poland than of a country that has been independent and outside of Russia’s orbit for the last 30 years. He completely misread the situation in Ukraine, that Ukrainians would fight back. He did not anticipate the strong Western response, either, as he saw what was happening in Ukraine more as a domestic than a foreign policy issue.

There was a strong Western response but also a lot of criticism, especially towards Germany’s Russia policy. What did we get wrong?

Germany, like other countries, was in denial for a long time about Putin’s ruthlessness. He and people around him in the Kremlin have been very much shaped by their personal histories in the security services. And then there is the broader perspective of Putin’s ambitions in Europe. The big mistake people made in Germany and elsewhere was to think that Putin inhabited the same worldview as we do. Russia is the only empire left in Europe and Putin thinks like the head of an imperial state. He believes that Russia still has the right to have a sphere of influence in Europe. But there was also a mutual misreading. Germany, ever since the introduction of Ostpolitik, was very focused on finding ways of engaging with Russia. The economic aspects of engagement, especially in the energy realm, led Putin to believe that he had bought off the West, not just Germany but also the United States.

To what extent did Europe’s relations with Russia affect transatlantic relations?

When I was in the National Security Council, I tried to work very closely with my European counterparts on pushing back against Russia. But we faced a lot of resistance from the top of the German,

‘The mistake was to think that Putin had our worldview’

Former senior director for European and Russian affairs in the National Security Council Fiona Hill on why Putin started the war in Ukraine, mistakes made concerning Russia and her expectations of Germany

German respondents: For each of the following issues, do you see the United States as a partner?

- Protecting European security: 81% in 2022, 73% in 2021
- Dealing with Russia: 61% in 2022, 68% in 2021

US respondents: For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner?

- Protecting European security: 68% in 2022, 80% in 2021
- Dealing with Russia: 56% in 2022, 56% in 2021

Limited comparability to previous years due to a change in methodology from telephone to online survey.
French, and other governments. The invasion of Ukraine has finally created the universal jolt that has had everybody simultaneously reassessing relations with Russia. In Germany, the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny, who was taken there for treatment, caused more of a reflection. But this should have been done a lot earlier. And in my own experience, there was a lack of recognition that Russia was in many respects attacking all of us in different ways, through covert operations and subversion.

What could democratic leaders learn from the Putin experience when dealing with their counterparts in autocratic states?

We were never able to retain a consistent focus on Russia and a continuous assessment because we were constantly changing political direction. This is part and parcel of being democracies. Russia under Putin is not interested in compromise, so we must be as resilient as we possibly can and constrain it. And we also must be transparent in communicating with the public about why this matters so much, especially as Russia always gets the upper hand in disinformation. Our leaders must make sure that they share a clear message about what is happening.

The increase in Germany’s defence budget was a response to the invasion. How do you assess the changes in German foreign and security policy?

For Germany itself – 70 years since the end of the Second World War – it is time for a rethink because you cannot always rely on others over the longer term. I know that this internal process of reflection has already been taking place. But the ability to cooperate and work with others in collective defence through NATO, the European Union and bilateral partnerships is essential.

What international role should Germany play?

I think a lot of people are looking at Germany to play a more active role when thinking about security and leadership. Not just by providing funding, as Germany has in many respects for security, but also by taking a more assertive role in driving European security forward. The difficulty will be economic pressure. The United States has for decades been highlighting the vulnerability of Germany being so much dependent on Russian gas and oil. Now the German economy must go through a period of wrenching transition. We were trying to move away from hydrocarbons in any case because of climate change, but now it’s been forced upon us as a national security liability. There is also an expectation now that Germany will not only address its vulnerabilities but also those of others. There could be a German effort for a much more integrated approach to energy security not to do this alone but together with all its European partners. This is an epoch-making war here. It is like the First and Second World Wars in terms of changing the configuration of everything. And we are going to have to accept some pain to become more resilient over the longer term.
What are the greatest challenges currently facing German foreign policy?

- Ukraine
- Energy crisis
- Climate and environment
- Relations with Russia/Russia policy
- Refugees and migration policy

2022: don’t know 4%, no answer 1%

US respondents, 2022: don’t know/no answer 5%

Which country currently is the most important partner for the United States?

- Germany
- France
- Russia
- China
- UK
- Israel

2022: don’t know 17%, no answer 4%

Limited comparability to previous years due to a change in methodology from telephone to online survey

Does Olaf Scholz as chancellor represent Germany’s interests in the world rather better, rather worse or as well as Angela Merkel?

- 2022: don’t know 5%, no answer 3%

Does Olaf Scholz as chancellor represent Germany’s interests in the world rather better, rather worse or as well as Angela Merkel?

- 2021: don’t know 5%, no answer 3%

How would you rate the current relationship between Germany and the United States?

2022: don’t know 13%, no answer 4%

2021: don’t know 13%, no answer 4%

As well as

Rather worse

Rather better

2022: don’t know 6%, no answer 3%

2021: don’t know 5%, no answer 3%
German respondents: For each of the following issues, do you see the United States as a partner?

- **Protecting European security:**
  - For 2022, 81% answered strongly and 73% answered very strongly.
  - For 2021, 81% answered strongly.

- **Dealing with China:**
  - For 2022, 61% answered strongly and 41% answered very strongly.
  - For 2021, 61% answered strongly.

- **Securing access to energy sources:**
  - For 2022, 47% answered strongly.
  - For 2021, 47% answered strongly.

- **Protecting the environment:**
  - For 2022, 40% answered strongly.
  - For 2021, 41% answered strongly.

Answer 'neither' ranged from 1 to 3 per cent for all issues.

US respondents: For each of the following issues, do you see Germany as a partner?

- **Protecting European security:**
  - For 2022, 68% answered strongly and 80% answered very strongly.
  - For 2021, 68% answered strongly.

- **Dealing with Russia:**
  - For 2022, 56% answered strongly.
  - For 2021, 59% answered strongly.

- **Dealing with China:**
  - For 2022, 52% answered strongly.
  - For 2021, 57% answered strongly.

- **Securing access to energy sources:**
  - For 2022, 63% answered strongly.
  - For 2021, 80% answered strongly.

- **Protecting the environment:**
  - For 2022, 63% answered strongly.
  - For 2021, 80% answered strongly.

Answer 'neither' ranged from 6 to 8 per cent for all issues; Limited comparability to previous years due to a change in methodology from telephone to online survey.

What is more important for Germany...

- **Having close relations with the United States:**
  - **2022:**
    - 72% answered very strongly.
    - 62% answered strongly.

- **Equidistance:**
  - **2022:**
    - 11% answered very strongly.
    - 29% answered strongly.

- **Having close relations with Russia:**
  - **2022:**
    - 13% answered very strongly.
    - 16% answered strongly.

War in Ukraine: How strongly are you concerned about...

- **A nuclear strike by Russia:**
  - **2022:**
    - 11% answered very strongly.
    - 20% answered strongly.

- **An extension of the war onto NATO territory:**
  - **2022:**
    - 38% answered very strongly.
    - 30% answered strongly.

- **Very strongly**
- **Strongly**
- **A little**
- **Not at all**

2022: don't know 3%, no answer 0% | 2021: don't know 3%, no answer 2%
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s reputation among its partners has... 

- Stayed the same: 42%
- Worsened: 39%
- Improved: 13%

2022: don’t know 4 %, no answer 2%

What was decisive for Russia’s invasion in Ukraine?

- Russia’s great-power aspirations: 73% (Improved), 23% (Worsened)
- Putin’s domestic political interests: 72% (Improved), 23% (Worsened)
- The orientation of Ukraine towards the EU: 73% (Improved), 22% (Worsened)
- Russia’s perception of threat from potential NATO enlargement: 62% (Improved), 33% (Worsened)

2022: don’t know 4 %, no answer 2%

Should Germany durably invest more money in defence?

- Rather yes: 37%
- Rather no: 60%

2022: don’t know 2 %, no answer 1%

Should Germany play a military leadership role in Europe?

- Rather yes: 29%
- Rather no: 68%

2022: don’t know 2 %, no answer 1%

Answer ‘don’t know’ and ‘no answer’ ranged from 1 to 4 per cent for all issues.
Does Germany need its own nuclear weapons to guarantee its security?

Rather yes 7%

Rather no 90%

2022: don’t know 2%, no answer 1%

Should the German Bundeswehr/the US military be involved in foreign conflicts to...

German respondents:
Protect the security of Germany 76% 83%
Protect the security of Germany’s allies 74% 79%
Build democracy 49% 55%

US respondents:
Protect the security of the United States 90% 85%
Protect the security of US allies 76% 77%
Build democracy 38% 58%

Do you approve or disapprove of Finland and Sweden potentially becoming NATO members?

German respondents: 75%

US respondents: 60%

From whom should Germany/should the United States purchase energy supplies for electricity and other needs?

German respondents, 2022: don’t know 1%, no answer 1% | US respondents, 2022: don’t know/no answer 2%

German respondents:
Only from democratic countries 38%

US respondents:
Only from democratic countries 48%
What is more important for Germany...

Having close relations with the United States | Equidistance | Having close relations with China
--- | --- | ---
66% | 10% | 18% | 2022
67% | 9% | 19% | 2021

2022: don’t know 4%, no answer 1%
2021: don’t know 3%, no answer 2%

What is your view of China’s growing influence?

- Negative
- Neutral
- Positive

2022: don’t know 1%, no answer 1%

Do the following countries represent a major, a minor or no military threat to...

... Germany’s security? (German respondents):
- China: 37% major, 51% minor, 22% no military threat
- Russia: 50% major, 25% minor, 25% no military threat

... security in the United States? (US respondents):
- China: 26% major, 7% minor, 66% no military threat
- Russia: 66% major, 5% minor, 5% no military threat

China: 51% major, 37% minor, 12% no military threat
Russia: 34% major, 35% minor, 21% no military threat

answer ‘don’t know’ ranged from 1 to 4 per cent for all issues

Should Germany reduce its economic dependencies on China, even if this leads to economic losses?

Rather yes | Rather no
--- | ---
66% | 29%

2022: don’t know 4%, no answer 1%
The survey for Germany was commissioned by Körber-Stiftung and conducted by KANTAR PUBLIC Germany in August 2022. Telephone interviews conducted with a representative random sample of 1,088 participants in August (Margin of error: < 1.4 per cent for unit values of 5 per cent; < 3.1 per cent for unit values of 50 per cent).

German data and results available at www.theberlinpulse.org.

The survey for the United States was conducted by Ipsos for Pew Research Center in July and August 2022. Online interviews conducted with a representative random sample of 12,147 participants for the July 18–July 31 survey wave (Margin of error: +/- 1.4 per cent at the 95 per cent confidence level) and 7,647 participants for the August 1–14, 2022 survey wave (Margin of error: +/- 1.7 per cent at the 95 per cent confidence level). The 2022 US survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.

Is enough being done in Europe to become independent from Russian energy supplies?

German respondents: Yes 31% No 60%

US respondents: Yes 27% No 67%

Have you ever heard of the expression ‘feminist foreign policy’?

German respondents, 2022: don’t know 6 %, no answer 3 % | US respondents, 2022: don’t know/no answer 6 %

Yes, 12% Yes, I know exactly what it means 26%

No, never 46%

Yes, but I don’t know what it means 16%
China is closely watching Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine to learn from the Kremlin's failures on the military, diplomatic and economic fronts. Beijing already thinks it knows better how to prepare for a 'reunification' with Taiwan. Europe needs to be aware that an escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have even more severe consequences worldwide than Russia's President Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine. To prevent such a scenario, the European Union should ideally undertake the following five steps:

1. **Take the words of authoritarian leaders literally:** China's President Xi Jinping has mentioned reunification on many occasions. In addition, the Anti-Secession Law of 2005 says Beijing has the right to 'employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity'.

2. **Prevent the further internationalization of the yuan:** Russia's war against Ukraine has made it obvious that modernizing one's army is not sufficient. China will also need to achieve economic, technological and financial autonomy. The SWIFT banking system and the dollar can be powerful instruments for economic statecraft by the United States. Seeing how this has been used against Russia will accelerate China's push to internationalize its currency.

3. **Diversify supply chains to diminish dependency on China:** The EU's current experience with energy dependency on Russia might lead to a growing understanding – especially within Germany's business community – that too much engagement with China represents a danger. This will have a big impact on the EU to the extent that its China policy will become much more hostile and critical, coordination with the United States on strategies to contain China in the Indo-Pacific and EU markets will increase, and a lot of EU resources will be used to repatriate manufacturing from China. In security, NATO engagement on containing China will also increase, especially through military cooperation with Australia and Japan.

4. **Cooperate with the United States and other like-minded countries to stay engaged in Asia:** The EU, the United States, and their allies, especially those in Asia, have realized that China's claims about defending its 'core interests' are much more than intimidating rhetoric. This should motivate the EU even more to increase its engagement in Asia, alongside like-minded partners. A Chinese monopoly on development, infrastructure and connectivity in the region can be prevented, in particular, through the Global Gateway Initiative.

5. **Strengthen cooperation with Taiwan:** Building relations with Taiwan should be done on the level of the EU and bilaterally by individual member states. Cooperation should be most intensive in the economic, technological and cultural realms but also progressively deepened on the political level.

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**European policy and a German Sonderweg towards Russia**

All EU member states should jointly create a unified 27+1 EU format for cooperation with China. In addition, enhanced coordination of action with international allies, including within the World Trade Organization, is needed to respond to economic coercion, find systemic long-term solutions and take unprecedented, decisive action to change our normal peacetime order. Transatlantic solidarity and unity are key to withstanding autocracies such as China, Russia and their like.

Despite Germany’s Russia problem, more recent development gives hope that foreign policy thinking in Berlin is changing. ‘In the future, there can be no more German Sonderweg with Russia that is at the expense of our Central and Eastern European partners,’ wrote Michael Roth, the Social Democrat who chairs the Foreign Affairs Committee in Germany’s parliament. In this context, our position with regard to China has to be crystal clear: We should not repeat our mistakes we made vis-à-vis Russia. 

Laima Andrikiene is a member of the parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, chairperson of its Foreign Affairs Committee and a signatory of the Act of the Restoration of Lithuania's Independence.

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**Do the following countries represent a major, a minor or no military threat to...?**

- **Germany’s security? (German respondents):**
  - China: 37% major threat, 2% minor threat, 9% no threat
  - Russia: 51% major threat, 5% minor threat, 1% no threat

- **security in the United States? (US respondents):**
  - China: 64% major threat, 7% minor threat, 5% no threat
  - Russia: 26% major threat, 22% minor threat, 5% no threat

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**Another Chance to Listen to the Baltics**

The European Union can play an active role in preventing an escalation in the Taiwan Strait.

Five suggestions from Lithuania:

- **No more German Sonderweg with Russia**
  - Russia has been preparing for a major confrontation with NATO for a long time. Over the years, the Kremlin used its military against its neighbours, violated international law, and spread instability in Eastern Europe and beyond. New methods of ‘borderization’ and holding rigged referendums in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine became the unstoppable everyday reality and a test for the Western world. As we all witness today, the Kremlin also employs massive propaganda and disinformation campaigns to justify its aggression against Ukraine and to conceal its war crimes and atrocities. It simultaneously tries to shift the blame with anti-Western narratives and by reinterpreting Western sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine as alleged involvement in the war. The ‘unlimited friendship’ and cooperation agreement signed with China just before Russia started its war against Ukraine speaks for itself.

- **Take the words of authoritarian leaders literally:** China’s President Xi Jinping has mentioned reunification on many occasions. In addition, the Anti-Secession Law of 2005 says Beijing has the right to ‘employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’.

- **Prevent the further internationalization of the yuan:** Russia’s war against Ukraine has made it obvious that modernizing one’s army is not sufficient. China will also need to achieve economic, technological and financial autonomy. The SWIFT banking system and the dollar can be powerful instruments for economic statecraft by the United States. Seeing how this has been used against Russia will accelerate China’s push to internationalize its currency.

- **Diversify supply chains to diminish dependency on China:** The EU’s current experience with energy dependency on Russia might lead to a growing understanding – especially within Germany’s business community – that too much engagement with China represents a danger. This will have a big impact on the EU to the extent that its China policy will become much more hostile and critical, coordination with the United States on strategies to contain China in the Indo-Pacific and EU markets will increase, and a lot of EU resources will be used to repatriate manufacturing from China. In security, NATO engagement on containing China will also increase, especially through military cooperation with Australia and Japan.

- **Cooperate with the United States and other like-minded countries to stay engaged in Asia:** The EU, the United States, and their allies, especially those in Asia, have realized that China’s claims about defending its ‘core interests’ are much more than intimidating rhetoric. This should motivate the EU even more to increase its engagement in Asia, alongside like-minded partners. A Chinese monopoly on development, infrastructure and connectivity in the region can be prevented, in particular, through the Global Gateway Initiative.

- **Strengthen cooperation with Taiwan:** Building relations with Taiwan should be done on the level of the EU and bilaterally by individual member states. Cooperation should be most intensive in the economic, technological and cultural realms but also progressively deepened on the political level.
Member of Turkey’s parliament and chairman of its Committee on Foreign Affairs Akif Çağatay Kılıç on Turkey’s position regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden joining NATO, and the importance of the Black Sea region

Körber-Stiftung: In the past, Turkey, also called Türkiye, aimed to maintain a balanced relationship with Russia. Is this still the case?

Akif Çağatay Kılıç: Russia is an important country for us. As an energy provider for Türkiye, Geography also plays an important role as Russia is our neighbour through the Black Sea. From the beginning of the invasion, we offered to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. People are losing their lives and this must stop immediately. Political differences must be solved at the negotiation table and not by using military means. We voice our position very openly despite the fact that we are dependent on Russia in areas such as trade, energy and tourism.

Taking this dependence on Russia into account, is Ankara doing enough to pressure Moscow to end the invasion?

We do not accept the illegal invasion of Ukraine. Türkiye was one of the first countries to actually legally recognize and categorize the invasion as a war, because after that we could activate the Montreux Convention. This gave us the right to close the Dardanelles and the Bosporous Strait, which is hindering Russian military movement and is also giving very strong support to Ukraine. Imagine a Russian or Ukrainian military ship passing through the strait. Türkiye would need to enforce the Montreux Convention and thereby become actively involved in the conflict. We took a huge step and also a high risk by the way we reacted. I believe that in some areas we are doing even more than the European Union to pressure Russia.

Türkiye has not supported the EU sanctions regime against Russia. Why?

Is Türkiye a member of the European Union? As far as I am concerned, we are not. However, I personally believe that sanctions are not working the way we want, not only regarding Russia. Countries that imposed sanctions are also being affected by them. Now, you can say that people should show solidarity. I can understand this perspective but our aim is to stop the military actions. Did we achieve this through sanctions so far? No. This goal can be achieved only by bringing all parties to the negotiation table. And is Russia itself affected by these sanctions? To some degree.

As reaction to the invasion, Finland and Sweden decided to apply for NATO membership. Turkey agreed to sign the accession protocols to start this process by only under certain conditions. Should a moment of international crisis be used to achieve Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy ends?

What we claim is not new. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is labelled as a terrorist organization by the European Union, Sweden, Finland and the United Nations, among others. Türkiye is a member of these institutions, and a negotiating country for full EU membership. Put yourself in our position. We have the second-largest standing military force in NATO after the United States. We are one of the biggest financial contributors to NATO and host NATO military installations on our territory. As a NATO member, we are attacked by a terrorist organization, and we unfortunately have lost more than 40,000 civilians. If Finland and Sweden become NATO members, they can call for Türkiye’s help if they’re attacked, which Türkiye will provide. However, they do not recognize the threat the PKK poses as a terrorist organization to our security and prosperity. What we want is that our security needs are respected as well.

All parliaments of NATO members have to give their approval before both countries can become members of the alliance. How quickly will this happen in the Turkish parliament?

The trilateral memorandum signed between Türkiye, Finland and Sweden in Madrid at the end of June clearly the obligations and responsibilities that Finland and Sweden have agreed to fulfill. If they do not fulfill them, we will rethink our position as well.

What are the implications of Turkey’s current rapprochement with the West for the war in Syria, where Turkey and the United States stand on different sides?

The US position regarding certain terrorist elements in our border region in Syria is not tolerable. We will not accept the PKK terrorist organization moving around as they want and committing terrorist acts there. We have sent the clear message that, as a NATO ally, we are doing our part regarding the international fight against terrorism in Syria. But Türkiye is also building housing opportunities in Syria for the 4.5 million Syrian refugees living in Türkiye to be able to go back to their country.

German policymakers would probably name the South China Sea if asked for a geopolitically important maritime space. Do we pay too little attention to the Black Sea region?

The Black Sea region is geographically linked to EU borders. European decision-makers know about the importance of the region but there is a lack of engagement, especially economic. Right now, the worldwide grain and seeds shortage perfectly shows the global importance of the Black Sea region and that more European engagement is needed there.

What kind of engagement are you thinking about? We have found natural gas in the Black Sea. This could be an area for cooperation with, for example, Germany. But also engagement and cooperation in areas such as agriculture, workforce, and investment in research and development. There are a lot of young brains in the Black Sea region very actively involved in research, which is why technological investments should increase.

Germany will spend an additional €100 billion on security and defence. How is this step perceived in Turkey?

The German military apparatus needed an upgrade, and I think this is now being done. The invasion of Ukraine has, of course, increased public support for such a move. But I do not see any positive or negative effects. It is quite natural for a country to upgrade its old systems and infrastructure. Maybe this was neglected too much in the past. Other members of the Turkish parliament active in defence and international politics put it like this: ‘They needed it anyway. Now with international developments they realized they have to do it.’

How do you imagine the future of European security?

Most members of the European Union are also NATO members. So why duplicate security structures? We have a well organized alliance that is providing the necessary security, if needed. Maybe we should amend NATO’s position, its infrastructures or its legal basis, but thinking about the future of European security.

Can European security be rebuilt without Russia?

This process definitely needs to happen in cooperation with Russia. It is a nuclear power, and it has a certain amount of technological experience and knowledge. What Moscow is doing right now is wrong and unacceptable. But Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, where it has the right to veto. Russia is always going to be part of the international system, also in Europe.

Restoring Stability and Freedom in Europe

40
Strategic Autonomy Does Not Mean Unilateralism

India’s cooperation with Europe will prove crucial for solving global challenges ahead
By Priyanka Chaturvedi

The ongoing war in Ukraine has triggered widespread condemnation and a chain of reactions, dramatically altering the international world order. It has also provoked the polarization of countries around the world against or in support of Russia. India’s response to the conflict has been unique for a global power. Although it abstained from voting for a UN Security Council resolution that condemned Russia’s military action against Ukraine, it went on to highlight its deep concern over the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and expressed uneasiness about Moscow’s actions.

India lays emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy, and it has, therefore, urged Russia and Ukraine to return to the path of diplomacy. In addition, India has repeatedly called for ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states’ and ‘for the immediate cessation of violence and hostilities’. This balanced approach to the crisis is rooted in India’s tradition of non-alignment, evoked by its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.

Despite India’s engagement – it has sent 7,725 kilograms of essential medicines and medical equipment to Ukraine – many in the West accuse it of not being empathetic on this issue and of not condemning human rights violations strongly enough. These critics claim that this contradicts India’s fundamental foreign policy beliefs in peace and non-violence. But, as Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has emphasized, India’s foreign policy is not based on accepting the ‘construct’ of siding with any power axis. Rather, India is entitled to weigh its own interests and have its own side, especially due to the rise of authoritarian regimes in its neighbourhood. India’s best bet could be strategic autonomy in geopolitics.

But strategic autonomy does not mean unilateralism. The opened global order and the current geopolitical realities have pushed the need to build strategic partnerships. The visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Germany, Denmark and France in May 2022 indicated the government’s intent to bolster partnerships and strengthen ties with like-minded allies in Europe. India and the European Union, both ‘unions of diversity’, share values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. They are equally convinced of the necessity to preserve the rules-based international order and effective multilateralism. Each has an interest in the other’s security, prosperity and sustainable development. This is why the leaders of the EU and India have held multiple meetings and summits in the last two years, and released a roadmap to 2025 that touches on these areas of common interest.

The war in Ukraine and the strengthening of authoritarian states worldwide led to rapid changes in the geopolitical environment. These developments made India and the EU recognize the need for joint, in-depth strategic engagement. India’s priority is to maintain its strategic autonomy, but at the same time it wants to converge with Europe. The continent’s new strategic orientation towards India and its intent to enhance its maritime footprint in the Indo-Pacific have opened up the opportunity for an even more robust relationship.

To tap the yet untapped potential of India-EU relations, both sides need to urgently realign their supply chains in strategically important sectors, such as defence and energy, and work on a more nuanced understanding of each other’s societies, politics and cultures.

India-EU relations have untapped potential
Germany is India’s largest EU trading partner and despite the pandemic, trade between them increased by 12 per cent between April 2021 and March 2022. In addition, Prime Minister Modi and Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz have deepened ties and opened avenues in metro rail construction, the Namami Gange conservation project, green transmission lines, smart cities, high-speed railways and solar rooftop projects. This realignment is expected to make Germany India’s third-largest trading partner in the coming years.

As Europe seeks deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a strong partnership with India will prove crucial. India and the EU, as the world’s two largest democracies, can effectively work towards maintaining a rights-based global order. With the economic and political consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war and the aggressive rise of China, there is also a need for a powerful transatlantic alliance in the Indo-Pacific security framework. With growing economic competition, the impact of climate change and threats of cyber warfare, a coordinated global response – especially between India, the EU and the United States – will be fundamental. Even if the responses to the Russia-Ukraine conflict by India and the EU do not align, India and Europe will be essential for each other in the coming decade, especially in this time of polarization in countries worldwide.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s reputation among its partners has...

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Priyanka Chaturvedi is member of parliament in the Rajya Sabha, the Indian Council of States. She serves on the Consultative Committee on External Affairs, among other committees.
The Global South in the context of shifting power relations
By Grace Naledi Mandisa Pandor

The world sits at possibly the most dangerous juncture since the end of the Second World War. As conflict continues to rage in Ukraine, the ramifications are being felt worldwide, and, given that nuclear powers are involved, the conflict has the potential to escalate into one that poses a danger to the entire globe.

The war has starkly exposed a multiplicity of weaknesses in the global security architecture that is meant to preempt conflict. It has also underscored the reality that the international community does not treat all conflicts with equal firmness and attention. Many conflicts and injustices have been allowed to persist without being dealt with by the energy, vigour and support seen in the case of Ukraine. Calls for respect for international law and for all to uphold the key tenets of the UN Charter sound hollow when many such breaches are unchallenged and ignored.

Not all conflicts are treated equally by the international community

The Global South is consumed by a range of critical questions. First, given that the Russia-Ukraine war is said by some to signal a tectonic shift in global power relations, we need to assess what this means for us in the Global South. Africa was torn apart by competing Cold War interests and conflicts, and we do not wish a repeat of this.

Second, there is alarm at the fact that the premier global body responsible for upholding international peace and security, the UN Security Council, has proved to be inept at doing so, largely due to the fact that permanent members are the main hostile parties in this war. While the war is between Russia and Ukraine, the world’s most powerful countries are involved.

In war, it is the poorest who suffer

Third, whenever the world faces crises of this magnitude, it tends to be the poorest who suffer. Africa and the developing world are not immune from the developments in Ukraine. The war has impacted negatively our economies, and today many African countries face grain shortages, high fuel prices, food inflation and dangerous threats of angry civil uprisings. We cannot afford this type of instability. Many children in my country go hungry as nutritious food has become too expensive for many households. Such consequences of war are rarely taken into consideration. It is due to our awareness of the repercussions of war that South Africa continues its repeated call for extensive diplomacy and negotiations to speedily achieve a ceasefire and a peaceful settlement.

South Africa has maintained a clear position of not to be aligned with any of the protagonists or major powers involved. At times our positions may be at odds with those of our friends, but we are confident that we are guided by our commitment to human rights, international law and the equality of nations.

Wars can only end through negotiations

South Africa’s position, in keeping with that of much of the Global South, is an independent, non-aligned one that advocates negotiation rather than the devastating war that is raging today. We have not taken a neutral position, as some have alleged, but a non-aligned one whereby we prefer to be aligned with any of the protagonists or major powers involved. At times our positions may be at odds with those of our friends, but we are confident that we are guided by our commitment to human rights, international law and the equality of nations.

The war has pointed to the urgent need for the global community to seriously attend to the reform of the United Nations. Particular attention must be given to the role, composition, powers and function of the Security Council. South Africa has been arguing for such reform for well over two decades. This has been resisted, especially by veto-wielding permanent members. Now that the Security Council has begun to utilize the General Assembly as a deliberative body with voting power, we are hopeful that issues of peace and security, including that of self-determination for Palestine and Western Sahara, territorial integrity and other conflicts will all enjoy the equal attention and support of the most powerful nations.

The United Nations urgently need to be reformed

In discussions with various countries, we have expressed concern at the resort to war and continued to push for peace through the good offices of the United Nations secretary general. We have been assured that, should countries of the Global South need help with food security, they will receive it. We only hope that this will be in the form of humanitarian assistance and not loans that will mire developing countries further in debt.

Our greatest hope is for a silencing of the guns in Ukraine before that war engulfs large swathes of the globe, eroding all the gains achieved since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of apartheid, potentially destroying us all.

Grace Naledi Mandisa Pandor is South Africa’s minister of international relations and cooperation and a member of parliament in the National Assembly.

Should Germany become more strongly engaged diplomatically, militarily or financially?

Diplomatically 65%
Financially 13%
Militarily 14%

2022: don’t know 6%, no answer 2%
Over the past few months, we have witnessed how the war in Ukraine has altered global patterns of trade, production and consumption of commodities. The war has had a devastating impact on the price of food, fertiliser and fuel, exacerbating food insecurity and inflation.

Food crises affect everyone but they are particularly distressing for the most vulnerable, as poor families typically spend two-thirds of their income on food. Poor countries that are already in debt distress or at high risk of it now face an additional threat: Import bills for wheat, rice and maize are surging fast and are estimated to rise by more than 1 per cent of their GDP over the next year. That's more than double the size of the 2021–2022 increase.

The war exacerbated food insecurity and inflation

The global community must act with urgency or risk widespread hunger and malnutrition, leading to social unrest or the displacement of masses of people. The war in Ukraine is a wake-up call, reminding us that food systems have long been reeling from multiple crises. Acute food insecurity was on the rise in many countries even before the war, reflecting economic shocks, multiple conflicts, a historic drought in East Africa and an extreme locust infestation.

To navigate our way out of this food crisis once and for all, we will need to meet urgent needs while tackling longer-term challenges.

First and foremost, we must help families put food on the table by expanding social safety net programmes for the most vulnerable through well-targeted cash transfers. We must help farmers by promoting efficient and sufficient use of fertiliser, and by providing them with support in the face of rising fuel and input prices, and financing.

Globally, keeping trade open is critical as restrictions further exacerbate market shortages and lead to higher prices. Regrettably, since the start of the war in February 2022, restrictive trade-related policies have increased as countries scrambled to ensure that they had adequate food supplies for their populations. As of early June, there were 320 active trade measures in 86 countries affecting food and fertiliser. Nearly 40 per cent of these have been restrictive, causing the price of some commodities, especially wheat, to shoot up.

Food systems are a source of greenhouse gas emissions

Trade restrictions must be temporary, transparent and targeted. The recent G7 meetings underlined the importance of refraining from inappropriate measures that limit trade and of avoiding unjustified export bans on food or fertiliser. The World Trade Organization’s Declaration at its 12th Ministerial Conference in June was another positive step in this direction.

On longer-term challenges, we need to invest in strengthening food systems to make them more resilient, resource-efficient and productive, and less harmful to our environment, as risks rise in a world of multiple overlapping crises. While food systems face the adverse impacts of climate change, they are also a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions – one-third of global volume.

The need for collaboration – at the global, regional and national levels, and among governments, the private sector and international organizations – has never been more critical, both to limit the severity of food crises and to coordinate fragmented financing. According to the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, 78 per cent of all aid for agriculture in 2018 was bilateral, comprised of 13,649 activities with an average funding of $500,000.

Every crisis brings opportunity to improve the food system

Germany's government has played an instrumental role in improving coordination. An important initiative in this regard is the Global Alliance for Food Security launched in May, which was initiated by Germany as G7 chair. The alliance will help countries and organizations channel information on their actions and decrease fragmentation. Germany can share best practices to catalyse an immediate and coordinated response, and to ensure food systems remain resilient.

Previous crises have also resulted in useful mechanisms that are helping stabilize markets and address food insecurity. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, launched by the G20 in the wake of the 2007–2008 food crisis, is an effective financing mechanism that mobilizes other sources of funding such as the International Development Association, the World Bank’s fund for the poorest. This effort could be broadened to support low-income and middle-income countries. The Agricultural Market Information System, also part of the response by the G20 during the previous food crisis, is an interagency platform to enhance food market transparency and encourage international policy coordination, which is essential to avoid contradictory information signals.

As damaging as they may be, every crisis brings opportunity. While responding to urgent needs, we must also ride on the momentum to rebuild a more sustainable food system as part of overall efforts to recover and achieve green, resilient and inclusive development. By strengthening coordination, learning from experience and building on current mechanisms, we can get out of this food crisis once and for all.

Mari Pangestu is World Bank managing director of development policy and partnerships and former minister of trade of Indonesia.
It has been a truism for years that a full-blown transition from fossil fuels to green energy sources is a precondition for tackling the climate crisis. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has added a painful exclamation mark to this statement, especially for European countries with high dependencies on oil and gas. The mammoth task of the energy transition has thus become even more urgent and its geopolitical dimension all the more obvious.

The transition requires a profound change of course in European (and global) energy and industrial policies, and also a rethink of many facets of foreign policy. It calls for a fast and broad diversification of resources and suppliers, likely resulting in adjusted trade patterns and partners as well as new forms of diplomacy (such as the Climate Club initiated during Germany’s G7 presidency this year).

Maintaining energy security will require a careful, and perhaps uncomfortable, recalibration of who can be considered a partner for Europe and Germany, and for which set of issues. The German public follows a rather pragmatic approach on this question: A majority of 55 per cent would obtain energy supplies from all states in contrast to 38 per cent who would favour energy imports only from democratic states. For the latter group, the truth may be a bitter pill to swallow as the need for more diverse partners for the green transformation may collide with the values-based foreign policy approach proclaimed by Germany’s government. Finding a balance between conflicting priorities will be a challenge for policymakers in Berlin and in many other capitals.

While the need for energy security seems to call for a quick fix, especially as Russia has it hand on the gas tap, Europe should avoid another pitfall: replacing one dependency with another, such as on liquid gas from the United States or rare earths from China. Barely any European state can become completely energy-independent due to geographical and geological factors. A thoughtful diversification of resources thus seems inevitable (see the contributions by Martina Merz, Yu Hongyuan, Wang Xiaoyue and Yu Yunhan, and Robert Glasser in this part). As Jens Stoltenberg points out, international organizations such as NATO can serve as exchange fora for their member states to deliberate strategies for decreasing dependencies.

Clean energy will transform geopolitics. The weight and influence of petro-states will diminish in favour of green champions, forcing many international players to update their business models (see article by Abdulaziz Sager). At the same time, new forms of conflict over minerals and other resources are likely to surge. Navigating this environment in flux will be a tall order. Sherri Goodman and Pauline Baudu show us what a world with a completed energy transition could look like and why it is worth striving for. Without a doubt, we are anything but powerless to make it happen.

Enjoy reading! ▲
The geopolitics of a decarbonized future in 2040. A scenario
By Sherri Goodman and Pauline Baudu

Sherri Goodman is secretary general of the International Military Council on Climate & Security and senior fellow at the Wilson Center. From 1993 to 2001 she served as the first US deputy undersecretary of defense on environmental security.

Pauline Baudu is a research assistant at the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute and Environmental Change & Security Program, and at the Center for Climate and Security in Washington DC.

In 2040, full decarbonization has been achieved, leading to a new energy order and to reshaped geopolitics. How did we get there? The positive fallout of President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine and weaponization of oil and gas against Europe has accelerated the green energy transition. Europe, the United States and their strategic allies received a wake-up call on the urgency not only to reduce carbon pollution and save the planet from devastation but also to free themselves from the tether of fossil fuels in general, and Russian energy in particular.

The war was a wake-up call to reduce carbon pollution

Global leadership has overcome technological and market constraints as well as the institutional and financial infrastructure that used to lock in a fossil-fuel-dependent system. Clean technologies have surged due to massive investments, no new oil and gas field or coal plant has been approved since 2022, strong policies have incentivized energy efficiency and demand reduction, and carbon-off-setting systems compensate for the negligible remaining amounts of natural-gas combustion.

In this future, renewables have reconfigured energy interconnections, which have shifted from global markets to more distributed regional grids. However, global reliance on rare earths and related materials critical to renewable energy generation, electrification and energy storage has increased, reshaping energy geopolitics. Producing countries such as Australia, Chile, China and Russia play a strategic role in securing supplies. New patterns of great-power geo-economic competition take shape to control supply chains, access intellectual property and maintain technological advantage. Yet, a single hegemon is unlikely to emerge and control trade routes due to the ubiquitous nature of renewable power sources.

China is in a leading position, being the largest producer of rare minerals and the main exporter of renewables technology, and dominating supply chains and manufacturing. The United States, although exposed to stranded assets, is also well positioned due to its technological advantage, including in nuclear energy and biofuels. Both countries are major economic and military powers, with an uneasy relationship over their spheres of influence. Both countries control select supply chains, with the United States dominating in technology innovation, including that for next-generation clean batteries, and China having greater strength in low-cost manufacturing at scale for various components of the clean energy supply chain. Both countries also face their own climate vulnerabilities, which is why their ambivalent relationship is a mix of climate cooperation and competition on green leadership through foreign mining investments and partnerships with developing nations. The European Union also benefits from decent reserves of mineral resources and accumulated mining know-how. In achieving their transition, EU countries have ended their dependency on Russia and secured greater energy and geopolitical resilience while still needing to protect their green tech industry from Chinese anti-competitive behaviour. Germany, once the biggest EU importer of Russian oil, has led the way in deploying renewable energy through its domestic Energiewende. Berlin has reversed its opposition to carbon-free next-generation nuclear energy and is now adopting small modular reactors in select locations as part of its climate and clean-energy strategy. Transatlantic cooperation has also been pivotal as US-led investments have boosted technological innovation. Another major clean-energy powerhouse is India, which combines human talent at scale with innovation in the solar and renewables sector.

Germany is now in favour of next-generation nuclear energy

Conversely, the energy transition has been a challenge for fossil-fuel producers due to the decrease in the economic and geopolitical value of oil and gas. Major Gulf states exporters took advantage of the shift by offsetting their losses and diversifying their economies, with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates leading in renewables. However, the Gulf states have lost geopolitical influence as oil prices are no longer a source of foreign policy leverage. Less resilient countries, such as Algeria, Iran and Russia, were somehow able to manage the transition, although loss of revenues strongly weakened their domestic social cohesion and led to unrest. Other fragile states, such as Angola, Libya, Nigeria and Timor-Leste, lacked the financial and institutional resources to diversify their economies and have been suffering a greater impact due to poor governance practices and increased exposure to conflict. These countries might see a stabilizing effect from the transition in the long run through less corruption, more equitable wealth distribution and reduced foreign interference. However, their fragilities and complex conflict patterns, previously aggravated by oil considerations, continue to intersect with other mutually

Is enough being done in Europe to become independent from Russian energy supplies?

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German respondents, 2023: don’t know 6% | US respondents, 2023: don’t know/no answer 6%
reinforcing factors such as ethnic tensions, weak state capacity and domestic climate impacts. Strengthened global governance institutions and leading economies have stepped in to manage economic and security risks from the transition. They provide incentives to build the infrastructure for the energy transition, regulate minerals trade and allow G20 nations to partner with poorer countries through technology transfer and financial compensation for foregone fossil rents. In addition, a revitalized NATO has emerged as a green standard-setter, leading by example by reducing the carbon footprint of its forces, adapting military operations to the unavoidable impacts of climate change and acting as a platform for the exchange and amplification of good practices.

We will face fewer conflicts over energy resources

However, new tensions and vulnerabilities have emerged. While the incidence of conflicts over contested hydrocarbon reserves has decreased, those intersecting with bad-governance factors and social fragilities have been difficult to settle. Conflicts over key minerals, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, emphasize the need for good governance, environmental regulation and respect of land-tenure rights. Russia’s loss of influence due to its failure to diversify its economy from oil and gas, and its ability to manage its many climate vulnerabilities, including permafrost collapse and wildfires, have made it an even more disruptive nation. Digitalization and the greater reliance on interconnected electricity grids increased the risks of cyberattacks, highlighting the need for global cybersecurity norms and rules.

New forms of climate diplomacy and international cooperation emerge

Alliances in which fossil fuel played a key role, such as those between the US and Saudi Arabia or Russia and China, weakened. Comparative advantages have led to new partnerships. The Israel-Jordan-United Arab Emirates cooperation deal on solar energy and water desalination is a vivid example of this. New forms of diplomacy have emerged, such as solar diplomacy led by India through the International Solar Alliance. At the national level, although government intervention played a key role during the green transition in incentivizing the private sector and mitigating risks, the shift to renewable energy has led to increased decentralization of energy systems. New sub-national actors, such as the Pacific Northwest Clean Energy Alliance, which includes the US states of California, Oregon and Washington, and the Canadian province of British Columbia, emerged. These actors gave a more central role to cities.

In the energy transformation phase, governments designated certain types of oil and gas installations as ‘transition assets’ and took an active role in helping private companies build pipelines and terminals equipped with carbon-capture technology or for low-carbon fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia. Incentives have been implemented to foster public-private partnerships and reverse the balance of risks of the private sector, which maintains a crucial role in climate finance, adaptation investments and technology innovation.

Finally, the transition has reshaped the global security landscape, particularly as hydrocarbon leverage has almost disappeared, leading to a less conflict in international politics.

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One Question for Jens Stoltenberg

How does NATO react to the growing importance of energy as a ‘hybrid war’ tool and the geopolitical implications of the energy transition?

Jens Stoltenberg

The concept also underlines the need to enhance energy security. While energy policies are primarily a national responsibility and were not traditionally seen as a security issue, energy now plays an increasing role in shaping our common security. In this context, investing in a stable, sustainable, diverse and reliable energy supply, and in similar providers and sources, is highly important for the security of NATO allies. We lessen thereby strategic dependencies, enhance the alliance’s resilience and improve operational effectiveness, while ultimately contributing to combating climate change.

Since 2008, NATO has been implementing a robust energy-security agenda. By sharing intelligence, conducting political discussions, or organizing expert workshops, NATO has developed its capacity to support the protection of critical energy infrastructure, and helped ensure reliable energy supplies to the military.

NATO will continue to be an essential forum for the allies to consult, coordinate and exchange best practices, and to identify, analyse and mitigate the potential impact of new dependencies on allies’ security. For example, changing energy patterns could create strategic advantages for our systemic challengers and potential adversaries, such as the opportunity to control new energy sources and trade routes. The volatility of oil and gas prices may fuel instability in supplier and consumer countries.

NATO will help to coordinate energy transition efforts

The energy transition could create new dependencies, such as on the rare earth minerals needed for renewable energy and batteries. The NATO Action Plan on Climate Change and Security as well as the NATO 2030 Agenda, adopted at the Brussels summit in 2021, are important to prepare for the impact of climate change on our security and to help the alliance and its armed forces adapt to and mitigate this impact. As announced at the Madrid summit earlier this year, NATO will help the allies to coordinate their energy transition efforts by setting shared benchmarks and standards and innovating together, while maintaining operational effectiveness.

It is essential to continue investing in national and alliance-wide resilience and preparedness in order to withstand potential shocks and mitigate their effects. The alliance, therefore, has substantially stepped up its work on resilience in recent years. In 2016, NATO leaders agreed to seven baseline requirements for national resilience to help the allies increase preparedness. In 2021, the allies strengthened this commitment, recognizing that resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment, and that a whole-of-society approach – involving governments as well as citizen organizations, private companies and knowledge institutions – is essential to address the risks and vulnerabilities we face. The 2022 Strategic Concept underlines the importance of resilience and sets the ambition of working more closely with NATO partner countries and international organizations such as the European Union to boost resilience and counter the coercive use of political, economic, energy, information and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors.

Through our enhanced focus on resilience and energy security, we are adapting NATO to deal with the complex, multidomain threats and challenges we face in a more competitive and dangerous world.
Energy Transition as a Governmental Priority

Germany and Europe can count on the Gulf countries to ensure their energy security and to shape the climate agenda
By Abdulaziz Sager

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a fundamental redefinition of energy security, the ultimate impact will most likely be an acceleration in the entire energy transition.

This provides immense opportunities when it comes to the relations between the Gulf countries and Germany and the European Union as the latter two seek to become almost completely independent from Russian energy.

The Ukraine crisis has further elevated the Gulf countries’ status as vital energy providers. In 2021, they produced approximately 30 per cent of the world’s crude oil while holding almost half of the world’s proven oil reserves. Their role in promoting renewables, decarbonization and other energy alternatives is also gaining importance, which increases opportunities for substantive relations with Europe.

The Gulf region can contribute to European energy security

Even if the Ukraine crisis is resolved quickly, the Middle East and especially the Gulf region will remain the key supplier of crude oil for the world. The EU’s ties with Russia are unlikely to be restored, and energy supplies from other parts of the world need time to come onto the European market. In the short term, the Gulf region can be a reliable source of alternative supplies and, therefore, significantly contribute to European energy security.

There are two aspects to consider here. First, the Gulf oil producers still need to look ahead and anticipate peaks in energy demand. The world is in a period of high economic volatility and maintaining spare capacity is important for oil producers to be able to respond to shifts in the market, including the possibility of genuine supply shortages. They have no interest in prolonged high oil prices, as this ultimately leads to increased production from other sources, such as shale oil producers, and to a drop in demand.

Gulf countries look for solid energy partnerships

Second, for Gulf countries, demand security plays an equally important role as supply security. As the oil and gas sector still contributes about 40 per cent to the GDP of their economies, they rely on stable buyer-seller relationships. This is what makes ties with Asian countries so significant for the Gulf region. And the stability of non-politicized supply is a key factor in these countries’ partnerships with Gulf producers.

Current negotiations between Germany and Qatar over potential gas deliveries in the short term relate to this problem. While for the moment Germany seeks a short-term solution to the current energy shortage that does not bind it into any dependency once again, Qatar – like the rest of the Gulf countries – looks for a long-term commitment to a stable export market on which a solid energy partnership can be built.

In this context, Germany could face rising demands from Gulf countries to play a moreconcerted security role in the region and the broader Middle East. For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Germany’s position on key issues of the Middle East, most importantly concerning Iran, is important.

Germany must avoid falling into the trap of repoliticizing energy relations

It is essential that Germany also see the GCC states as partners that can play a critical role in the security and stability of the wider region. At the same time, Germany, the EU and the rest of the international community, together with the GCC, must avoid falling into the trap of repoliticizing energy relations. This would reinforce volatility and insecurity not only in energy markets but also in bilateral ties. In broader terms, their energy ties should be viewed primarily in the context of a commodity, governed by buyer-seller relations.

There is a strong commitment by the leadership of the GCC countries to accelerate decarbonization as climate change becomes an existential issue for the region. Pursuing an energy transition away from hydrocarbons has become a governmental priority. This includes proactive participation in shaping the current climate agenda, increased investment in renewable energies (such as blue and green hydrogen) and pushing forward the concept of the circular carbon economy. The Saudi Green Initiative and the Middle East Green Initiative aim to see a 60 per cent reduction in carbon emissions by 2030. Moving closer to the net-zero goal is a clear indicator of a strategic shift in the region.

The Gulf countries are strongly committed to decarbonization

At the Petersberg Climate Dialogue this year, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock declared climate change to be ‘the biggest security problem facing everyone on this earth’. The Gulf countries should be seen as part of the solution – not as the problem.

Abdulaziz Sager is chairman of the Gulf Research Center.

From whom should Germany/should the United States purchase energy supplies for electricity and other needs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Germany respondents:</th>
<th>US respondents:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only from democratic countries</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From all countries</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>46%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

German respondents, 2022: don’t know 5%, no answer 2% | US respondents, 2022: don’t know/no answer 6%
A Green Giant?

Two perspectives on China's ambivalent role in the global energy transition

By Yu Hongyuan, Wang Xiaoyue, Yu Yunhan

By Robert Glasser

Energy transition is the key to climate change, which is a development issue as well as an environmental problem. China's energy transition, led by the government, has been working on economic, social and technological fronts. It aims to meet the domestic need for green and low-carbon growth, peak carbon emissions by 2030 – as agreed upon in the Paris Agreement in 2015 – and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, while ultimately adding to the supply of global public goods and fuelling ecological conservation worldwide. As a result, China's energy transition plays a vital role in the global energy transition, global green development and global energy governance. This includes the creation of a clean and diversified energy supply system and updating this system to align with the new reality of geopolitics.

First, the global energy transition relies on China. Despite being the largest emitter of carbon dioxide worldwide, the country has become a leader in green technology and clean energy sources in recent years. By 2030, the share of non-fossil sources in primary energy consumption in China will rise from the current 16 per cent to about 25 per cent. The total installed capacity of wind and solar power generation will grow to more than 1.2 billion kilowatts, an increase of nearly 20 per cent compared to today. In 2020, China's utilization rate of its hydro, wind, and solar power capacity reached almost 100 per cent. Based on the 14th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy Development, China will roll out additional policy instruments and invest even more money to support the development of renewable energy and energy storage technologies.

Second, China is often viewed as a pioneer in global green development. Guided by a new development philosophy – innovative, coordinated, green and open development for all – and its focus on high development standards, China has entered a stage in which enhanced energy supply, optimized energy consumption structure, improved energy technology and environment-friendly energy markets are not new. China owns nearly one-third of the world's renewable energy patents and is becoming the weather vane for international renewable energy investment. In particular, it has remained the world's biggest polysilicon producer in the global solar industry for ten consecutive years, and there is a well-established supply chain in the country's wind and solar power equipment manufacturing industries.

Third, China is committed to reforming the global green governance system and helping other countries solve environmental and development issues with its funds, technologies and consulting. The Green Belt and Road Initiative shows how China advances global ecological conservation together with other developing countries. So far, it has signed cooperation documents with 145 countries and 32 international organizations.

Two factors determine China's green leadership role. One is its comprehensive national power, which is growing steadily despite the threats posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical conflicts. Another factor is cooperation instead of cutthroat competition. China works with other developing countries, such as South Africa, to build international research and development centres and cooperation platforms for renewable energy and low-carbon technologies. Great-power struggle gives way to bilateral and multilateral cooperation with others like the European Union or Germany. China and the EU have been working on establishing a green partnership, economic cooperation in sustainable production and consumption, and trade on green energy products. With the release of the REPowerEU plan – which requires a higher level of imports of Chinese products like solar panels – mutual interdependence is closer to reality.

China and the EU have been working on a green partnership

Admittedly, when providing a stable and green environment for global development, China's increased soft power and its bigger say in international energy governance have been additional benefits of the country's energy transition. For instance, the concept of 'ecological civilization' initiated by China was included in the UN Kunming Declaration. The further China engages in its energy transition, the greater its national power will be. Yet power is not what China pursues. It is rather the tool in China's safeguarding of developing countries’ common interests, practising clean-energy diplomacy, and constructing a new type of foreign relations with mutually beneficial cooperation.

China's comprehensive energy transition, consequently, will be oriented towards bluer skies and cleaner water for all.
What is more important for Germany ... ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Having close relations with the United States</th>
<th>Equidistance</th>
<th>Having close relations with China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>67%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>2021</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2022: don’t know 4 %, no answer 2 % | 2021: don’t know 3 %, no answer 2 %

The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the G7 Leaders meeting hosted earlier this year by Germany included the announcement of a major expansion of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). The JETP will assist emerging economies to accelerate their transitions from fossil fuels to renewables. It was launched at the 2021 Climate Change Conference in Glasgow to help South Africa accelerate the retirement of coal plants and the deployment of renewable energy. This latest announcement will extend such assistance to India, Indonesia, Senegal and Vietnam.

The expansion of the partnership reflects the G7’s concern that the Paris climate targets will not be achieved without major financing and other support for the energy transition in emerging markets. However, it also reflects the G7’s attempt to counter China’s increasing prominence in renewable-energy investments, particularly in Asia.

China is the largest financier of renewable energy in the Indo-Pacific. Its significant funding is critical to supporting the regional energy transformation. But G7 leaders have also expressed concern that Beijing will leverage this financing for political influence and strategic advantage by creating financial and technological dependence on China.

These concerns are heightened by China’s dominance of renewable-energy products and control over rare earth minerals supply chains and the processing capacity to produce them. The International Energy Agency estimates, for example, that China’s global share in all key manufacturing stages of solar panels, which currently exceeds 80 per cent, will rise to more than 95 per cent in the coming years.

**China is willing to use its control of the supply chains**

China has demonstrated its willingness to use its control of supply chains in pursuit of its wider geopolitical interests, most notably in 2010 when it retaliated to a maritime dispute with Japan by restricting rare earth mineral exports to that country. However, it is important to keep in mind that China’s regional energy investments are motivated by multiple, overlapping objectives, including securing economic advantage, achieving energy security, building greater geopolitical influence and leverage, and reducing climate risks.

This multidimensional engagement in Asia’s renewable energy systems has significant implications for countries outside the region, including Germany. One clearly positive implication is that China’s investments in renewable energy are a fundamentally important contribution to preventing dangerous climate change. Indeed, without China’s engagement, it will be impossible for Germany to deliver on a key objective of its recent Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, namely ‘phasing out of coal-fired power generation and ... the termination of financing for coal-fired power plants by Asian countries’.

**China’s domination of the renewables market is a significant risk**

Supply-chain risk is a second implication. The EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific emphasizes the priority of securing the resilience of the EU’s supply chains. The COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have starkly demonstrated the costs of failing to do so. China’s domination of the renewable-energy market is a significant risk. And this risk may be growing. Recent reporting suggests that Beijing sees Russia’s disruption of gas supplies to Europe as a major opportunity for China’s wind and solar energy firms to expand their European market and presence.

There are at least two dimensions to the supply-chain risk. The first is the opportunity it affords China to leverage its control over resources and technologies to extract geopolitical concessions from its competitors or adversaries. The second is the exposure and vulnerability of China’s own domestic renewable-energy infrastructure (for instance, one out of every seven solar panels produced worldwide is manufactured at a single Chinese facility) to natural disasters that are rapidly intensifying due to climate change.

It must be a top priority for the EU to diversify its renewable-energy supply chain as rapidly as possible. This will require, among other things, joint investments to diversify the critical-minerals markets and financial partnerships to bring clean-energy products to markets faster.

**Germany must find ways to engage with China**

China is playing the pivotal role in the global energy transformation from fossil fuels to renewables. Germany and its allies must find ways to engage with it to accelerate the transformation or face the prospect of catastrophic climate change. Identifying opportunities to do so without undermining other important German interests, such as a commitment to the rules-based international order, is an urgent, daunting and crucial challenge.
How to Do Business in a New Geostrategic Reality

Europe will not become energy-independent immediately. Governments and companies must set up new international partnerships together

By Martina Merz

If there were any doubts about the need for a successful energy transition in Europe, they disappeared with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February. Decarbonizing the economy is no longer just a question of climate protection but also essential for stability in Europe. It is the duty of politics and the business community to make this economic and energy policy transition a reality.

- We can no longer take change through trade for granted

The war has created new geopolitical realities and thrown long-held principles of our globalized world overboard. Russia has attacked not only a sovereign state but also our value system. Throughout my career, I have always believed in the potential for change that trade can unleash, and thyssenkrupp has operated on this conviction. The interdependencies in today’s world seemed so great, and the interconnectedness so strong, that such a brutal attack on another country was inconceivable. While I still believe that trade has the potential to foster cross-border cooperation, creating prosperity and security for all sides, we can no longer take political ‘change’ for granted.

Europe, especially Germany, has relied too unilaterally and for too long on Russia as a trust-worthy economic partner. With our energy dependency, we have given President Vladimir Putin coercive leverage that now prevents us from imposing even tougher sanctions. An immediate and complete withdrawal from fossil energy imports – especially gas – is not immediately possible because they could not be substituted by renewable energy resources and would, therefore, have devastating effects on our society, economy and national defence. After all, the challenges that lie ahead of us also require economic strength and endurance, especially as we are facing a decade of ecological, economic and industrial upheaval.

It would be dangerous to stumble from one energy dependency into another. To not be trapped, we need to procure different types of energy from different sources. In addition, investments must be made in energies of the future. The expansion of renewable energies, a modernized energy infrastructure, and the expansion of hydrogen production and distribution will reduce dependency on oil and gas imports as well as strengthen security of supply and climate protection.

- The era of ever-growing world trade in a peaceful environment seems to be coming to an end

At the same time, the new geostrategic realities force industry and politics to rethink how we do business. Global connectedness may have peaked. The era of ever-growing world trade in an unprecedented environment of peace and prosperity seems to be coming to an end.

In the short term, government actions are needed that boost the supply side of the green transformation. These include tax exemptions for producers, increased research funding, preliminary financing of green investments or government subsidies. They can help improve crisis resilience in the short term and mitigate strategic dependencies, particularly in the most sensitive industrial ecosystems, such as energy, semiconductors and steel. These basic industries are of particular importance to Europe’s strategic autonomy and value chains, and central to achieving climate targets as well as a resilient economy. After all, decarbonization that leads to deindustrialization would create social instability. Companies should be supported in setting up their business models in the transition phase in such a way that they generate enough revenue to finance it. This is not necessarily about financial support, but about framework conditions and market design.

- Demand for green products will push transformation

In the long term, market structures must incentivize consumers to change their spending behaviour and thereby increase demand for green products. This can be done through mechanisms like tax exemptions for consumers, preferential treatment for green products in public tenders or mandatory life-cycle assessments. Of course, these measures need time to take effect, but nothing will promote green transformation and push innovation more than the demand for green products. Above all, more sustainable goods produced in Europe increase our autonomy and strengthen our global negotiation position.

It is inevitable – Europe must strive for energy independence. But the reality is that Europe is also not independent in terms of energy today and will not be tomorrow. That is why true international partnerships must be formed and why the energy-for-cash model has had its day. The new type of partnership will ultimately mean sharing the value chains. The efforts of Germany’s government and companies to cooperate with Canada, Denmark and Qatar are good examples of building these. However, they remain individual cases according to the motto ‘first come, first served’. Instead, such partnerships must be built via the European Union.

- Supranational cooperation must be given top priority

This is the only way for Europe, which is dependent on energy imports, to be successful. The business community can play a key role here, supporting policymakers in building the true international partnerships needed now. This needs to be given top priority. We need supranational cooperation with lightning speed. Government-to-government partnerships must be brought to life by companies. It is up to businesses to develop value chains and business models that create win-win situations for a secure energy supply and a successful green transformation. After all, a diversification of energy sources translates into a mitigation of geopolitical risks.

Martina Merz is the chief executive officer of thyssenkrupp.
International and domestic perspectives on Germany’s feminist foreign policy approach

In times of war and geopolitical tensions, it becomes increasingly necessary to break new or forgotten ground when thinking about security. Feminist foreign policy brings different old and new concepts together and places human security, the participation of women and the inclusion of diverse perspectives centre-stage in its policymaking. It aims to respond to current global challenges by developing a foreign policy for all. As Germany formulates its feminist foreign policy guidelines, others are closely following this process and expressing their expectations of the country in this regard.

‘Feminist foreign policies can be crucial to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, no country in the region has a feminist foreign policy so far, thus providing the region with a unique chance to apply a gender lens in its foreign policymaking. Learning from Germany, but also Sweden or France, creates an opportunity for Australia and others to engage with their European counterparts and develop their own feminist foreign policy.’

Lisa Singh is the chief executive officer of the Australia India Institute and served as senator in Australia.

While this approach to rethinking security can only succeed if the public is on board, the latest survey results of The Berlin Pulse show that the expression ‘feminist foreign policy’ remains unclear to a majority of Germans. The government thus faces an additional challenge to improving its communication with the public and in fulfilling the high expectations of those international partners hoping that Germany will provide substantial impetus for advancing the feminist foreign policy agenda.

‘Any feminist foreign policy framework emerging from Germany needs to ensure three aspects, while keeping human rights and inclusion at its core. First, to integrate environmental security and emerging areas of security, such as water and food security. Second, to pay greater attention to new geographic theatres of conflict that are emerging. Third, to confront and question old and racist power structures.’

Ambika Vishwanath is the founder and director of the Kubermein Initiative.

Körber-Stiftung

Social development needs dialogue and understanding. Through our operational projects, in our networks and in conjunction with partners, we take on current social challenges in the areas of activities comprising ‘Innovation’, ‘International Dialogue’, ‘Vibrant Civil Society’, and ‘Cultural Impulses for Hamburg’.

Inaugurated in 1959 by the entrepreneur Kurt A. Körber, we conduct our own national and international projects and events. In particular, we feel a special bond to the city of Hamburg. We also maintain an office in Berlin.

International Dialogue

Conflicts arise in situations that are fraught with misunderstandings and lack debate. Moreover, such conflicts are often grounded in the past. This is why we champion international dialogue and foster a more profound understanding of history. We address political decision-makers, civil society representatives and emerging leaders from the younger generations. Our geographic focus is on Europe, its eastern neighbours, the Middle East and Asia, especially China. We strengthen discussions about history at the local level in a manner that stretches beyond national borders and encourage people to share their experiences so that history is not forgotten. Our foreign- and security-policy formats provide safe spaces for confidential talks built on trust. However, we also employ formats that involve the public, such as publications, competitions and networks, to spur debate about common European values and inspire the greater development of international cooperation.

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Have you ever heard of the expression ‘feminist foreign policy’?

Yes, I know exactly what it means
Yes, I know roughly what it means
Yes, but I don’t know what it means
No, never

Yes, I know exactly what it means
26% 12%
Yes, I know roughly what it means
16%
Yes, but I don’t know what it means
46%