Charles Sitzenstuhl: “Without agreement between Paris and
Berlin, the EU halts.”

Körber Stiftung: Since President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the French National Assembly last June and the subsequent elections, the government has been on the verge of collapse several times. What is happening in your country?

The political situation in France is complicated due to the lack of a majority in the National Assembly. With a minority government, it has become very difficult to implement major reforms, even though they are needed. For example, the national budget was passed later than the legal deadline, which was unprecedented. We are experiencing a level of instability not seen since the Fifth Republic was established in 1958. This level of instability creates anxiety among the population as it is new for France after six decades of political stability with majority governments.

How long will this uncertainty and instability last?

Until the next presidential election in 2027.

The political situation in Germany has also been quite unstable in recent months. How does the domestic situation in France and Germany affect the European Union?

Political struggles are not ideal for the European Union. But in France, our centralized presidential system helps maintain a consistent European policy despite internal disagreements. The president has the primacy in European affairs, ensuring a unified position. This has been a strength for France to make fast and clear decisions. In Germany, the balance of power between the government and parliament makes this more complex, affecting consistency in European matters. A newly elected government brings legitimacy, but this may not last. I hope the next cabinet under Friedrich Merz won’t wait to act.

Unlike other right-wing populist leaders, Marine Le Pen has distanced herself from Donald Trump. What is driving this?

I would not say she has distanced herself. She is simply silent for electoral reasons. The French far right admires Trump and shares his authoritarian and xenophobic values. They agree with his views against Ukraine. But she knows he is seen as unstable by the French public, so she remains cautious. Her attendance at the recent ‘MAGA of Europe’ gathering in Spain reveals her true alignment with the US far right.

Le Pen no longer advocates France leaving the EU, while the president of her Rassemblement National party emphasizes European investment and cooperation. Has their stance on European integration truly changed or is this also just a tactical move?

Pure hypocrisy. During the 2024, European Parliament elections, Marine Le Pen again said she was against the EU. After Brexit, public opinion in France turned against ‘Frexit’, the hypothetical French withdrawal from the EU, so they changed their narratives. However, their underlying goal remains to obstruct and dismantle the EU. Their rhetoric may have softened but their intentions remain anti-European.

Our annual public opinion survey, The Berlin Pulse, showed that Germans saw France as their most important partner between 2017 and 2019, but since then they name the United States, even after the recent election of Donald Trump. What influenced this?

The United States remains the global superpower and a military ally within NATO, for the time being. President Macron’s election and his pro-European agenda may have briefly influenced German views, but structural factors – history, economy and defence – shape the two partnerships differently. Nevertheless, the recent US administration’s attacks on the EU could convince Germans that France is indeed their strongest partner.

The Berlin Pulse survey shows that 69 per cent of Germans believe the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) harms Germany’s global image. Is the far right’s rise in Germany affecting how the French view their neighbour?

It depends. Supporters of the Rassemblement National may see it differently, but French mainstream media portray the AfD very negatively. It is a big issue to understand why far right radicalism is back in Germany. Despite its gains, it remains far from winning power. Germany has built solid institutions and a robust democratic system, and it has been deeply committed to memorial work and reckoning with its Nazi history. Yet, the far right is gaining ground. While the AfD is not the NSDAP, its rise is still very alarming in a country that has long prioritized remembrance and accountability. Who better than the Germans can understand the destructive potential of the far right. The next German government has a huge responsibility.

How can France and Germany tackle funding for the green transformation?

New European funding sources are needed to ensure that the financial burden does not fall solely on citizens. A European tax on the big tech companies could be a solution. The 2018 project of a EU digital tax remains a good idea. Since EU-wide action is difficult because of the unanimity rule on taxation issues, some countries like France have implemented national versions of this tax. But options are limited. One can increase member-state contributions, create common debt or impose new taxes on large corporations.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed to activate the EU’s fiscal escape clause to boost member states’ defence investment, along with tailored tools for each one of them. Are these measures adequate?

It is a positive step, but we need details as conditions will likely apply. Ultimately, defence spending remains a national responsibility. In France, there is clear consensus to increase defence spending, even if it is difficult to decide where to cut spending on other policies.

Should countries reconsider their approach to finance key investments in defence?

Yes, we need joint European defence spending, like the proposed EU Defence Bonds. European countries should collectively take on debt to fund common defence initiatives, rather than each acting on its own. The recent proposal by President von der Leyen to unlock up to €800 billion for defence investments is a fundamental step in this direction. The European Commission must facilitate the rearmament of member states, not constrain it.

In January, the Christian Democrats’ candidate for chancellor, Friedrich Merz, stated that the most urgent foreign policy issue for Germany was to repair relations with France and Poland. What steps can the new government that will soon be formed take to improve Franco-German relations?

The key factor is the personal relationship between the French president and the German chancellor, as major decisions are made at the top level. If the Bundestag elects Friedrich Merz as the next chancellor, positive gestures toward Macron will be important. However, good relations alone are not enough. We need concrete common goals to strengthen the EU. This includes boosting productivity, investing in research and enhancing cooperation in areas such as capital markets, banking and, most importantly, defence. Improving military interoperability and ensuring adequate defence spending are crucial. Without an agreement between France and Germany, progress in these areas at the EU level is impossible.

France and the United Kingdom have taken the lead in forming a ‘coalition of the willing’, aiming to work on a peace plan alongside one or two other states. Given Germany’s ongoing government coalition formation, do you believe Berlin will align with this initiative? What role do you expect Germany to play in this coalition, considering its traditionally cautious approach to military involvement?

Germany must understand that its rearmament must take place within a European framework if it is to be efficient, and legitimate in the eyes of its European partners. The Russian threat is closer to the German border than the French one. A Russian victory and the collapse of Ukraine would be very dangerous for Germany first.

The interview was conducted by Julia Ganter on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on 15 February and updated on 11 March 2025.

The Munich Young Leaders network is a joint project of Körber-Stiftung and the Munich Security Conference that provides a forum for future decision-makers to strengthen their international networks and inspire new thinking in foreign and security policy.

In cooperation with Table.Media, The Berlin Pulse Express Edition combines the foreign policy attitudes of Germans with expectations of Germany from abroad.