Thawing Order: The Arctic Question

From manageable tension to systemic crisis

Across three different moves, participants faced a progression from sanctions evasion and contested investments in Greenland to environmental disaster and hybrid disruption, and ultimately to military signalling and strategic confrontation involving Russia and China. A central insight was the fusion of risk domains. Financial loopholes enabled geopolitical influence; environmental shocks triggered humanitarian and political crises; and critical infrastructure – including undersea cables, ports and navigation systems – became instruments of coercion. These interdependencies compressed decision-making timelines and reduced the effectiveness of incremental responses.

Governance under pressure

but increasingly contested. Participants consistently emphasised the continued importance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), NATO, the Arctic Council (in its current mandate) and international regulatory regimes, while recognizing their limitations under stress. The challenge was not the absence of rules, but rather their selective application and competing interpretation. European credibility depends on consistent adherence to the standards it promotes, including in areas such as sanctions enforcement, navigation and resource governance. The exercise reinforced that effective Arctic governance requires institutional adaptation and political discipline, especially in an environment characterized by hybrid threats and attribution challenges.

Greenland as strategic pivot and vulnerability

Greenland was the geopolitical centre of gravity throughout the scenario. Economic collapse, dependence on external investment and strategic geography combined to create opportunity and vulnerability. Participants identified a fundamental dilemma: stabilizing Greenland economically is essential for regional security, yet doing so requires navigating external involvement without undermining Danish sovereignty or European strategic interests. The discussions also highlighted that long-term stability depends not only on financial support but also on sustainable development and local ownership, including diversification beyond extractive industries.

Indigenous communities at the core of Arctic stability

A critical takeaway from the scenario was the central importance of Indigenous communities, particularly in Greenland and across the Arctic region. Participants stressed that Indigenous populations are not simply vulnerable stakeholders and that they are essential actors in Arctic governance, with unique knowledge, political agency and rightful legitimacy. Strengthening Arctic resilience therefore requires the systematic inclusion of Indigenous perspectives in decision-making, particularly in environmental management, emergency response and long-term economic development.

Alliance dynamics and the need for coordination

The later stages of the scenario highlighted challenges to European and transatlantic cohesion. Unilateral actions, differing threat perceptions and varying escalation thresholds risked undermining coordinated responses. Participants stressed that clear red lines, pre-agreed coordination mechanisms and structured division of labour are essential to prevent miscalculation and maintain deterrence. Sustained engagement with the United States was seen as indispensable, even amid uncertainty regarding its policy, while strengthening European capabilities emerged as a key priority to reduce structural dependencies.

Shared but uneven responsibility

While all four country teams aimed to prevent escalation and preserve stability, their approaches reflected different priorities and strategic cultures. Germany focused on upholding the rules-based order and preventing escalation, combining diplomatic engagement with economic stabilization efforts. The United Kingdom emphasised deterrence, maritime security and pragmatic coalition- building alongside de-escalation, particularly in countering Russia and limiting Chinese influence. Denmark prioritized Greenland’s stability, sovereignty and crisis management, balancing domestic responsibilities with alliance dynamics. Norway adopted a strategy of continuity and restraint, emphasising situational awareness, regional expertise and de-escalation. These differences reinforce the importance of burden-sharing based on comparative advantage, rather than centralized coordination, as a practical model for European engagement in the Arctic.

Building a coherent European approach

The policy discussions converged around the need for a more coordinated and proactive European role in the Arctic. Key priorities include strengthening financial enforcement and sanctions integrity, providing credible alternatives to external investment in Greenland, enhancing maritime awareness and infrastructure protection, and developing joint crisis-response mechanisms for environmental and hybrid threats as well as improving EU-NATO coordination, while respecting the functional differences between institutions. Preparation and coordination ahead of crises were identified as decisive factors in shaping outcomes, rather than reactive measures once escalation is underway.

The Arctic as a test of order

The case of the Arctic illustrates how climate change and geopolitical competition are reshaping the strategic landscape. It is no longer a peripheral region; it is a front-line environment where the future of international cooperation and competition is being negotiated in real time. The central challenge for European actors is not only to prevent further escalation, but also to ensure that competition remains bounded by credible rules, supported by consistent enforcement and balanced by continued cooperation. How Europe responds in the Arctic will have implications far beyond the region. It will be a benchmark for its ability to act strategically in an increasingly contested world.

1. Play to strengths, share the burden

Responsibility in the Arctic should follow comparative advantage rather than centralized command. Oslo, Copenhagen and Nuuk are best placed to lead on Arctic security and Greenlandic affairs given their proximity and expertise, while Germany and the United Kingdom contribute through naval presence, funding and diplomatic weight. NATO should remain the channel for dealing with hybrid and military threats, the Arctic Council for environmental and Indigenous concerns, and the EU for economic instruments. This prevents duplication of efforts and ensures that the actor with the relevant capability and legitimacy leads on each issue.

2. Credibility requires consistency

European credibility in the Arctic rests on applying the same rules to allies as to adversaries. Insisting on UNCLOS compliance, freedom of navigation and sanctions enforcement against Russia and China only holds weight if European states observe the same standards in their own conduct, including in shipping and resource extraction. Double standards or demands that Europe itself would not meet erode legitimacy and give Moscow and Beijing grounds to dismiss European positions as political rather than principled. A credible Arctic policy must be one Europe is prepared to live by.

3. Do not give up on the United States

No European Arctic strategy can succeed by excluding or working around Washington. Germany’s assessment that there is no path forward against the United States, the United Kingdom’s reliance on its ‘special relationship’, and Denmark and Norway’s dependence on US engagement for Greenlandic stability and NATO’s northern flank all point to the same conclusion. Europe should sustain active outreach to Washington through bilateral and NATO channels, while exploring a US economic role in Greenland’s development and avoid steps that would push it toward disengagement or unilateral action in the region.

4. Close the capability gaps

Europe’s reliance on US military capacity and its exposure to Chinese capital are structural vulnerabilities rather than temporary gaps. Building European alternatives in rare earths, critical infrastructure and a coordinated Arctic platform would give Greenland a genuine alternative to Chinese investment, while a stronger European naval footprint in the GIUK Gap would reduce dependence on the US presence. Where military capability cannot be borrowed from allies on reasonable terms, Europe should build it domestically. The aim must be a shift from dependency to autonomy, not improvised substitution in a crisis.

5. Define red lines

Ambiguity in the Arctic invites escalation rather than preventing it. GPS spoofing, shadow-fleet activity and military exercises near European territory should be met based on pre-agreed thresholds rather than improvised responses, and communicated through NATO’s Article 4 consultations rather than ad hoc bilateral signalling. Attribution, as Norway and Germany stressed, is a precondition for deterrence to function. At the same time, the threshold for invoking NATO’s Article 5 should remain high and explicit. Red lines are only credible if they are defined and communicated before, not during, a crisis.

6. Coordinate and prepare

Pre-emptive coordination across domains limits the room for rivals to exploit a crisis as it unfolds. This means pre-arranged humanitarian and economic support for Greenland that can be delivered faster than Chinese offers, joint contingency planning with Canada and Denmark for environmental emergencies, agreed messaging toward Beijing without closing off diplomatic channels and a clear division between NATO and the Arctic Council on dealing with security and governance issues. Preparation set in motion before a crisis, not improvisation during one, will determine whether Europe shapes Arctic events or merely reacts to them.