Zin Mar Aung: “We are not losing”

Four years after the junta’s 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military government controls only 21 percent of the country’s territory, while rebel forces and ethnic armies hold 42 percent. How do you access the situation on the ground, Minister?

The military junta continues a brutal campaign, carrying out airstrikes without distinguishing civilian and military targets. One of our biggest concerns is protecting civilians from these air strikes. And of course, this is closely linked to cutting off aviation fuel and strengthening international sanctions against the military junta. But the other key critical question is how we can govern the territory we control. People want to know what the future of the revolution will be.

What can you tell them?

Look, despite the enormous challenges, we believe there is a future. We are not only fighting the military junta, but we are also building the foundations for a federal and democratic Myanmar. In areas under our revolutionary control, we are already establishing local governance systems. These are meant to lay the groundwork for a future Federal Democratic Union.

Can you give us examples?

We coordinate much of the humanitarian aid that arrives from abroad. Our role is to ensure the safe passage of aid in areas under our control. And as we do not have advanced air-defense systems, we establish grassroots networks to help reduce risks and improve civilian protection. For example, communication systems and internet messaging to share warnings about possible air strikes, for example when fighter jets take off from nearby airbases.

Let us talk about the elections held in January by the military junta. Do you expect that there will be less fighting by some resistance groups – will they start a dialogue with this military backed civilian government?

Some groups paused fighting and handed over a few towns they previously controlled. But this involves only limited areas. At the same time, revolutionary forces have expanded control elsewhere. In regions like Sagaing, for example, resistance groups have strengthened their presence. So, if you look at Myanmar as a whole, we are not losing, the revolution is still going on.

The National Unity Government (NUG) hasn’t renewed its electoral mandate since 2020 and has struggled to unify opposition forces, while the junta’s planned civilian government may gain recognition from some neighbors. How will you avoid losing ground or relevance?

The military is holding those sham elections because it is losing legitimacy. Their credibility is extremely weak. The people of Myanmar understand this. They voted in the 2020 election, and they know the military has neither the legal nor the political legitimacy to organize a new vote. At the same time, we are not relying only on the 2020 mandate. Our legitimacy also comes from the broad coalition we have built. The National Unity Government brings together elected lawmakers, ethnic revolutionary organizations, civil society actors and representatives of the democratic movement.

Russia has been a key supporter of the military junta, including through recent arms deals. How do you assess Russia’s influence and what are you doing about it?

This is a serious challenge for us and one of the reasons I am engaging with the European Union and countries such as Germany—to raise concerns about the international support the junta continues to receive. But Belarus and Iran have also supported the Myanmar military. Our message to these governments, especially to Russia, is that their support does not reflect the will of the Myanmar people and will not help bring stability to our country.

Are there any communication channels between you and the Russian government?

No. Since the coup, we have tried to communicate through the Russian embassy in Yangon, but we have not received any response. They don’t listen to us.

Are you in contact with the Ukrainian government, for example to exchange knowledge or information about warfare?

Not officially. There are some personal contacts and informal communication with Ukrainian friends, but there has been no formal or public engagement between us so far.

How do you assess the military situation of the People’s Defence Forces (PDF), and how are you addressing the challenge of maintaining a steady supply of weapons and ammunition?

The PDF began with mostly homemade weapons and has grown organically, relying largely on its own resources. Many fighters are young—mostly Generation Z—and have adapted and learned quickly for example via YouTube to enhance their capabilities. Logistics remains a major challenge, and we lack strong international support, which limits our ability to achieve a decisive victory. Still, we’ve sustained the struggle for over five years without significant external military aid.

What do you expect from Germany?

Germany plays an important leadership role in Europe. For example, with the reduction of funding from USAID, humanitarian support has become even more critical for Myanmar, so we hope Germany and its partners can help fill that gap. We also value Germany’s experience as a federal country. Myanmar is trying to build a future federal democratic system, and Germany’s model of federalism offers important lessons for us.

02.04.2026

In cooperation with Table.Media, The Berlin Pulse Express Edition combines the foreign policy attitudes of Germans with expectations of Germany from abroad.