Manish Tewari: ‘India’s realism is not a reaction. It’s always been our strategic DNA.’

Körber-Stiftung: Mr Tewari, during Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s visit to Berlin in May, he described the behaviour of many states in international politics as constantly hedging their bets in all directions. You argue that India needs to build a ‘system of alliances’. Is India pursuing a concrete strategy to build such alliances, and can this be reconciled with its goal of maintaining good relations with as many countries as possible?

The key question is: are we heading toward a new world order or back to an older one? I believe we are regressing to traditional European strategic principles: nations prioritizing sovereignty, self-interest and balance of power. Britain’s historical strategy, backing the weaker power in Europe to preserve equilibrium going back to King William III, is a useful example. This return to realism is not necessarily negative. Take the strikes by Israel and the United States on Iran: even though American intelligence saw no imminent nuclear threat, the strike happened. This reflects states acting on perceived self-interest, not common rules. If this becomes the dominant global pattern, we must abandon our illusions about a rules-based order. In such a world, alliances are strategic rather than ideological, which aligns with the concept of hedging.

Should India join other countries in their return to self-interest or should it try to counterbalance this dynamic?

India has always practiced strategic exceptionalism. That is our core approach. We stayed out of both World Wars in every deliberate sense. Yes, Indian troops were mobilized, but under colonial command. After independence, our strategic engagement has consistently focused on safeguarding national interests and not interfering in others’ affairs. That has been our raison d’êtat. As the world reverts to realism and sovereignty, India does not need to adjust. We have always operated on that basis, and that is the path we’ll continue to follow.

You said the United States is violating Iranian sovereignty and international law with this strike. Should India rethink its strategic partnership with the United States?

Whether we like it or not, international relations depend on the prevailing power dynamic. The United States remains the primary global balancer of power. Everyone must engage with Washington. Look at the recent NATO summit: despite internal divisions, European leaders were eager to work with Trump. We must accept our circumstances and work with it.

What is the Indian perspective on the new 5 per cent NATO spending target?

Every region needs to find its own modus vivendi. The Middle East must balance itself, as must Europe. Today’s global conflicts are striking. We have not seen so many multiple crises like this since the end of the First World War. These issues are becoming interconnected. This is how past world wars began. Increasing military budgets only creates standoffs. It does not address the root causes. We need political solutions.

In our The Berlin Pulse survey, 71 per cent of German respondents supported strengthening partnerships in Asia, Africa and Latin America after the U.S. election last November. Could this mean closer India-Europe ties?

India’s relationship with Europe is independent from its relationship with any other country. We have maintained strong bilateral ties with key European nations. We even had strong relations with Turkey until the May 2025 tensions. Over seven decades, India and Europe have built a robust relationship grounded in modern strategic thought and shared interest.

One of these shared interests is increasing trade. The free trade agreement between the EU and India has been in negotiation for many years. It is supposed to be finalized this year. How optimistic are you that this is going to happen?

I do hope that it will be ratified by the end of 2025. There is goodwill on both sides, but also a structural mismatch. The divide between Brussels and individual EU member states often confuses Indian negotiators. I have raised this since 2013, when talks stalled. Until the EU presents a more unified and comprehensible approach, a framework will not translate into a full-fledged free trade agreement.

The situation in the Middle East remains very unstable. You advised India to practice ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘extreme circumspection in the Middle East.’ What do you mean by this?

India has significant interest in the Middle East, especially with our diaspora in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. But it is not in our interest to become directly involved in this war. This is where ‘exceptionalism’ comes in: stay engaged diplomatically without aligning militarily or ideologically. Nobody condones the horrific terror attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. But Gaza’s humanitarian crisis, because of Israel’s disproportionate use of force and collective punishment of civilians, is a crime against humanity. India must continue to raise its voice, but at the same time act prudently, to protect its own interests without taking sides.

Is the Indian government speaking out strongly enough?

The government’s response seems out of sync with the public mood in India.

And what is that public mood?

There is a growing call to reaffirm support for a two-state solution, condemn terrorism and oppose disproportionate force against civilians in Gaza. This view reflects global public opinion even in countries historically aligned with Israel, like France, Germany, or Canada and even the United States.

Is this where India and Germany could work together?

India is cautious about getting involved beyond its region. I was among the first in India’s political spectrum to openly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in parliament. But we also have to recognize how Russia frames its actions, going back to historical claims like the Kievan Rus of the 9^th century. When historical grievances are revived in this way, external non-European powers can only do so much. Following the Second World War, only two religiously influenced states were founded globally, both of which contributed to significant regional conflicts. The Israel–Palestine conflict is rooted in the British withdrawal from the Palestinian Mandate in 1948, similar to the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The countries in these regions must confront their histories and find agreements.

So Germany should focus on Russia–Ukraine, India on South Asia and the Middle East on itself?

Absolutely.

But what about global solidarity? Is regionalization not risky?

Where was the global solidarity during India’s four-year border standoff with China? We saw little support, especially from Europe. Solidarity must be consistent and a two way street for it to be meaningful.

India has territorial disputes with Pakistan and China in Kashmir. How likely is it that both countries could join forces in future conflicts?

The China-Pakistan relationship dates back to the early 1960s, when Pakistan illegally ceded part of Jammu and Kashmir to China. This territory had legally acceded to India in October 1947. We have long had to manage this dynamic, along with American and Pakistan relations. Despite these complexities, India has continued to grow and thrive. That said, at some point, we must find a modus vivendi with both Pakistan and China. One is the legacy of a painful partition, the other of undefined colonial-era frontiers. Empires do not have borders, they have frontiers, and when both India and China tried to formalize them, disputes began.

Ultimately, people want peace, progress and a better life for their children. No one wants bombs. That bigger picture must not be lost.

The interview was conducted by Julia Ganter and Leona Harting on 26 June 2025.

In cooperation with Table.Media, The Berlin Pulse Express Edition combines the foreign policy attitudes of Germans with expectations of Germany from abroad.