Jeongmin Kim: ‘Germany can be a bridge between South Korea and Europe.’

The six months of political paralysis and the collapse President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration following his martial-law declaration in December accelerated a fundamental shift in South Korea’s foreign policy, away from habitual alliances toward calculated, interest-driven partnerships. The election of Lee Jae-myung in June signals the rise of a new centrist-progressive nationalism. His administration promises a foreign policy where domestic sentiment and sovereign autonomy take precedence over geopolitical convention: a posture of ‘alliance without compliance’.

The crisis left a vacuum at a time of immense geopolitical uncertainty, amplifying public demand for pragmatic leadership. The centrist rebranding of the progressive Democratic Party’s Lee’s campaign, affirming the alliance with the United States as fundamental, was crucial to his victory, yet conservatives remain suspicious. His approach is a balancing act of preserving the security alliance while resisting any appearance of subordination. This pragmatic diplomacy means selectively advancing initiatives that align with the public’s view of the national interest. Consequently, while the alliance remains formally strong, growing public resistance to perceived economic asymmetry or strategic overreach, puts issues like defence cost-sharing and missions abroad under new scrutiny.

Lee’s North Korea policy is his sharpest break from progressive orthodoxy. He frames relations as risk management, investing in home-grown deterrence while rolling back Yoon-era provocative measures. He calls ideology-based approaches outdated given changed realities: Pyongyang’s deepening ties with Russia, Kim Jong Un’s formal abandonment of reunification and declining domestic interest in inter-Korean diplomacy. This has given Lee space to avoid pressure for rapid, proactive engagement. For now, he appears content to manage the status quo, even cheering on a return of Trump-Kim talks.

Lee also inherits a relationship with Europe marked by mutual hesitation. Momentum has stalled, with South Korea retreating from a larger security role and Europe often seeing the region through a US-centric lens. Yet areas of convergence remain – climate change, maritime security and defence-industrial cooperation – where shared interests offer opportunities.

There is also friction as some EU capitals push initiatives Seoul views as exclusionary. The latter sees rhetoric from leaders like France’s President Emmanuel Macron, prioritizing European-made defence systems over US ones, as potentially spilling over to Indo-Pacific partners. The near derailment of a nuclear deal with Czechia following a French court’s injunction reinforced these concerns.

The perception of an emerging ‘Fortress Europe’ mindset may erode trust by signalling unequal market access for Indo-Pacific countries. To move forward, Lee’s administration would likely expect clearer industrial standards and selective access to procurement programs for trusted non-EU partners, particularly members of NATO’s Indo-Pacific Four.

Whether European strategic autonomy is inclusive or exclusive will shape Lee’s response. If the door remains half-shut, he is likely to lean further into building partnerships with Australia, Japan, Southeast Asia and even China to preserve South Korea’s strategic flexibility, through regional minilateral formats such as for intelligence sharing. This would reflect Seoul’s interest in hedging against overdependence on any single bloc.

Germany stands out as a potential European interlocutor that South Korea views with greater trust. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Berlin has sought a broader global role, including in Northeast Asia. Its decision to join the United Nations Command (UNC) was seen in Seoul as a sign of commitment to peninsular security. Swift public messages of support by Germany’s chancellor and ambassador during the martial-law crisis, when the United States remained ambivalent, reinforced the country’s image as a like-minded partner for the new administration. While Lee may step back from Yoon’s wartime assistance for Ukraine, Germany is well positioned to be a bridge between Europe and South Korea when it comes to the European strategic debate.

Lee’s need to retain the support of moderates constrain him, yet the vacuum left by the collapse of Yoon’s conservative People Power Party gives the progressive bloc room to rebrand itself as more pragmatic and less ideological with a new centrist-progressive nationalism. Ultimately, Lee’s policy will be shaped less by alignment than by the public. The promise of sovereign autonomy will likely remain his compass abroad.

Jeongmin Kim is executive director at the Korea Risk Group (NK News, Korea Pro) and part of the Munich Young Leaders 2025 Cohort.

The Munich Young Leaders network is a joint project of Körber-Stiftung and the Munich Security Conference that provides a forum for future decision-makers to strengthen their international networks and inspire new thinking in foreign and security policy. https://koerber-stiftung.de/en/projects/munich-young-leaders/.

In cooperation with Table.Media, The Berlin Pulse Express Edition combines the foreign policy attitudes of Germans with expectations of Germany from abroad.