The Berlin Pulse 2025/26

Nearly a year after Trump’s return to the White House and in the first year of Chancellor Merz’s term, the German-American relationship is viewed very critically: three quarters of Germans (73 percent) rate relations with the United States as poor. Under Joe Biden’s presidency, 74 percent still considered relations with the United States to be good (The Berlin Pulse 2024).

A large majority of 72 percent of Germans supports the federal government’s plan to double defense spending over the next ten years. At the same time, 61 percent continue to reject a German military leadership role in Europe.

When asked about the greatest challenges for German foreign policy, 45 percent of responses—unchanged from the previous year—refer to the war in Ukraine. A total of 39 percent mention the issue of Israel/the Near East/the Middle East (2024: 17 percent), and 33 percent point to relations with the United States (2024: 10 percent). Both topics have thus gained significantly in importance this year.

In the view of Germans, the United States is no longer the most important partner for German foreign policy for the first time in three years. Instead, 46 percent now once again see France as the central foreign policy partner—just as during Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Only 26 percent still name the United States as the most important partner. The relationship with the United States is also being evaluated increasingly critically in international conflicts. Only 38 percent of respondents see the US as a reliable partner in dealing with the war in Ukraine, and only 23 percent consider it a partner for Germany in promoting democracy around the world.

While only 17 percent of Germans viewed the United States as an economic threat last year, that figure has now risen to 38 percent. At the same time, only 35 percent believe Germany can still rely on America’s nuclear umbrella. Instead, three-quarters (75 percent) say Germany should seek a nuclear umbrella provided by France and the United Kingdom.

Increasing alienation from the United States is also evident in social issues: a majority of 59 percent of Germans believe that people in Germany can freely express their opinions—yet only about one-third (35 percent) believe this is also true for Americans.

While 48 percent of respondents advocate a stronger German engagement in international crises, 43 percent would prefer Germany to exercise greater restraint. Clear differences between East and West are also evident on this issue. A majority of East Germans (52 percent), but only 42 percent of West Germans, support more restraint by Germany in international crises, whereas a slim majority of West Germans (51 percent) and only 35 percent of East Germans advocate stronger engagement. Of those favoring greater engagement, 72 percent primarily want diplomatic initiatives.

In the third year of the war in Ukraine, 59 percent of Germans support continuing to provide weapons to Ukraine in its fight against Russia. If an agreement to end the war were reached, 56 percent currently favor Germany contributing its own soldiers to a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine.

At the same time, there is skepticism regarding the intentions of Russian President Vladimir Putin: only 21 percent of respondents believe he is fundamentally interested in a negotiated solution. In parallel, concerns about Germany’s own security are growing. Forty-seven percent of Germans assess the military threat from Russia as very high—a significant increase from the previous year, when this figure was 39 percent. Concern about Russian attempts to influence public opinion in Germany is also high among the majority of Germans (54 percent).

Only 38 percent of respondents see a special obligation of Germany toward Israel due to historical responsibility stemming from the Holocaust. At the same time, in September—before the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip—almost three quarters (73 percent) believed that the federal government should exert stronger diplomatic pressure on Israel to end the war in Gaza.