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Dayton Dilemma: What if War Returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Despite decades of Western engagement and the ongoing accession process of the European Union, the Western Balkans are experiencing growing turmoil and crisis. Regional and European actors must navigate escalating political instability, economic struggles, and rising military tensions amid uncertainty over the region’s future trajectory.

Against this backdrop, the Körber Policy Game brought together a small group of high-level participants from France, Germany, Türkiye and the United Kingdom to assess how to address a military escalation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What policy options are available to ensure security and peace in the country and beyond? Can the existing multilateral formats still contribute to stability and crisis management? What could support for the Western Balkans look like? What role can external actors still play? How to manage internal and external spoilers?

The Körber Policy Game, in cooperation with Dr Dimitar Bechev of Carnegie Europe, took place in a confidential setting in Berlin in June 2025 – before recent developments inside Bosnia and Herzegovina including Milorad Dodik’s impeachment. This report summarizes the insights and positions generated by the Körber Policy Game. Please note that it reflects the authors’ analysis of the exercise and not necessarily that of the participants or the organizations involved.

Dayton Dilemma: What if War Returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Executive Summary

Preventing atrocities and conflict: Lessons learned?

A renewed military escalation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be just a local setback; it would be a direct test of European actors’ ability to act strategically in their continent. With war raging in Ukraine, transatlantic unity under strain and EU cohesion faltering, Bosnia and Herzegovina risks becoming a symbol of European paralysis. But it could also provide a turning point for renewed European leadership.

Avoiding a repeat of the Bosnian War demands more than rhetorical commitment. Back then, delayed and fragmented responses enabled a disastrous war and atrocities. The EU’s credibility as a peace project and a security actor was severely damaged. Today, the choice is stark: lead with unity and resolve or once again act too late with too little. Whether through unified EU action or flexible coalitions, the message must be unambiguous: European peace is indivisible and must be defended.

A collapse of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions or a violent secession attempt by Republika Srpska would trigger a chain reaction far beyond the country’s borders. It would mark the failure of post-war peacebuilding, potentially unleash ethnic violence, force mass displacement and destabilize the Western Balkans. It would also create space for foreign powers, especially Russia, to expand their influence in the region. The result would be a sharp blow to the EU’s credibility as a guarantor of peace and order.

‘Dayton came too early and there were no winners.’

The EU’s instruments for action

The EU is not powerless when it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially if France and Germany were to jointly take the lead. It has diplomatic, economic and security tools at its disposal. These include the executive mandate of the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), the enlargement process as a political incentive, financial leverage through pre-accession assistance and investment tools including the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, and restrictive measures against destabilizing actors. The Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, established by the Dayton Agreement, must be empowered, not just through its mandate but also with the backing of key EU member states. To be effective, the EU’s tools require political will and coordination. When it cannot achieve a full consensus, coalitions of the willing should step up to break paralysis and to manage the crisis effectively.

‘All of the measures taken will only protect what we have now.’

Synchronizing efforts

Effective crisis management depends on smart partnerships. As well as the EU, the United Kingdom remains a vital player with its historic role, diplomatic capabilities and military assets, and Türkiye is indispensable, not only as a NATO member but as a regional actor with deep ties across ethnic lines. Ankara’s firm stance against secession by Republika Srpska, its contribution to EUFOR and its engagement with the authorities in Belgrade and Sarajevo make it a key stabilizing force.

The EU, Türkiye and the United Kingdom could synchronize their efforts in deterrence, diplomacy and post-crisis planning. Their broader strategic interests already align when it comes to regional stability and preventing war. And deepening coordination with the United States and NATO would further amplify their message that attempts at destabilization will meet a firm and coordinated response.

Waging peace

Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be externally imposed; it must be built from within. The country’s state institutions, despite being weakened by political fragmentation and foreign interference, remain the core vehicle for sovereignty and peace. Strengthening these institutions by making them more functional, accountable and inclusive requires commitment from all three of the state’s constituent entities. The neighbouring countries must also take ownership of regional stability. Croatia and Serbia should be held accountable for any support to divisive forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Incentives matter too: accelerating progress for the Western Balkan states on the path to EU membership can reward cooperation and regional stability.

‘Europe is on its own in this crisis.’

Europe’s test again

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a test of whether Europe has learned from the past, when delay and division fuelled war. Today, only swift, united and regionally grounded action can prevent a return to violence. The challenge is not just to avert conflict but also to redefine Europe’s role as a guarantor of peace.

Policy Recommendations

1. Safeguard territorial integrity and prevent armed conflict

Europe must treat the defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity as a strategic imperative. In the face of secessionist threats and rising tensions, any moves to redraw borders must be firmly and immediately rejected. To be prepared for any event, the international community needs to make its military presence more credible. EUFOR should be expanded, strengthened and given a clearer, more forceful mandate. Its operational concept and rules of engagement must allow it to deter and to respond to organized violence by securing borders, protecting civilians, halting arms flows and upholding the constitutional order. A more capable EUFOR would send the decisive message that Europe will act to prevent conflict, not merely react to it. Broadening participation to include transatlantic and global partners would reinforce that commitment.

2. Reaffirm Dayton, but prepare for alternatives

The Dayton Agreement remains the legal foundation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s statehood. Upholding it through strong support for the Office of the High Representative and the full use of the Bonn Powers is essential. But Europe must hedge against a crisis that renders Dayton ineffective by remaining flexible about potential alternatives, should they be necessary. Future frameworks must safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity while reducing political fragmentation. Adjustments to the Dayton Agreement can only proceed with broad consensus within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and must address ethnic balances and potential spillover risks.

3. Enable local ownership and regional inclusion

Lasting peace must come from within. Local leaders, civil society and grassroots networks need support to lead reconciliation. Any future peace process must meaningfully include women, youth, minorities and religious communities to build a peaceful and resilient society. External guarantees must be balanced with internal buy-in. Türkiye should deepen its dual role as mediator and security partner, using its ability to reach across conflict lines. However, local and regional actors, in particular Croats and Serbs, can be spoilers and guarantors alike. Any actions by Europe and its partners need to reward their constructive behaviour but dissuade them from using spoiling tactics.

‘Crises provide a chance to do what everyone is too scared to do.’

4. Uphold the credibility of the EU

The EU’s credibility is on the line. Member states must be ready to impose real costs on spoilers inside and outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. That means suspending funds, and applying political pressure as well as confronting inaction within the EU. France and Germany must lead with resolve to forge consensus, in particular if member states use spoiling tactics. Enlargement policy should be used strategically: merit-based accession for Albania and Montenegro by 2030 would demonstrate that EU membership remains a realistic goal. If consensus within the EU proves impossible, coalitions such as the Quint or E3 must step in. Coordinated action through coalitions is preferable to unified inaction.

5. Keep the United States engaged – on Europe’s terms

Europe must anchor the United States’ involvement in a shared, stabilizing agenda. The United Kingdom is well placed to serve as a bridge across the Atlantic. The best way to keep Washington aligned with Europe is to present it with a convincing European strategy backed by credible capabilities. Without this, the United States may drift towards a separate course, undermining European priorities and regional stability.

6. Counter foreign interference and strengthen narrative power

Russia’s interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina through disinformation, financial influence and proxies must be met with a coherent counter-strategy. Türkiye’s connections to Moscow should be used strategically in this regard. As narrative power matters, Europe must invest in coordinated strategic communications to push back against hostile messaging and to engage diaspora communities. Platforms like the BBC and public-diplomacy tools are not peripheral; they are front-line assets in the struggle for legitimacy and stability.

Because you read “Results 2025”.