Photo: Ukrinform / Alamy Stock Photo
From Bad to Worse: What if Russia Wins?
In the spirit of ‘thinking the unthinkable’ and based on the idea of translating plausible – not necessarily probable – developments of current foreign and security policy issues into a future scenario, the Körber Policy Game seeks to develop a deeper understanding of the interests and priorities of different actors as well as their policy options. US support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression is uncertain, and Europe’s resolve is continuously being tested. After two and a half years of war and setbacks on the battlefield, the outlook for Ukraine remains challenging. Transatlantic relations are unpredictable in an US election year, which endangers the European security order. Moreover, the ‘rules-based international order’ is losing credibility, especially in the Global South. Autocratic powers such as China and Russia continue to undermine this framework, thereby weakening the influence of the West. Amid international crises and domestic political pressure, European countries need unity and strategic foresight now more than ever.
Executive Summary
What would be the consequences of Ukraine’s defeat?
The teams representing Germany, Poland, France, and the United Kingdom saw the outcome of the war against Ukraine as central to Europe’s security and stability. They defined it as their countries’ core interest that Russia cannot successfully end its war of aggression. Faced with the given scenario, all the teams struggled to accept a Ukrainian defeat and wanted to continue to support Ukraine, including militarily – even as a ‘rump state’. They agreed that a Russian victory would lead to a massive destabilization of Europe and undermine the international order. Anti-Western forces would be strengthened within Europe and around the globe, and trust in European countries and the United States as security providers would be shaken. The Polish team emphasized that a Ukrainian defeat would pose an existential threat to their country.
Should a new Trump administration seek a deal with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin over ending the war against Ukraine, this would pose a major challenge for all four countries. There was agreement that ‘We must signal to the United States that these negotiations and the future of Ukraine/ Russia also concern us’. Each team underlined that it wanted to prevent a deal over its country’s head but failed to come up with a joint strategy for how to achieve this.
‘We must signal to the United States that these negotiations and the future of Ukraine/ Russia also concern us.’
How would the Europeans react to US disengagement?
All the country teams emphasized the need to work with a second Trump administration and to try to keep the United States engaged in Europe, even if this required significant concessions – albeit to varying degrees. The prospect of a US withdrawal was significantly more problematic for the German and Polish teams than for the French team, and they were willing to go to greater lengths to make the United States stay. The UK team saw itself as ‘caught in the middle’ between Europe and the United States, but also as a potential broker. The French and UK teams were more open to a transactional approach to Washington. All four teams agreed that European countries must do more to guarantee their security and to contain Russia. However, a ‘Europeanization of NATO’ and the extent to which an independent European leadership capability should be sought or was even possible were assessed differently with each group and among them.
All four teams made European capacity to act and cohesion an absolute priority in the face of a US withdrawal. All emphasized that unity vis-à-vis the United States was most important. They warned against fragmentation and highlighted the necessity to act together and to form coalitions: ‘We have a strong interest in a strong Europe with a strong United Kingdom’. The G7 would be an alternative framework should the EU as a whole be unable to act.
‘We have a strong interest in a strong Europe with a strong United Kingdom.’
How much does the Global South matter?
Faced with parallel global crises, the strategic focus of all four teams was initially on the immediate threat to the security of Central and Eastern Europe. For the German team and especially the Polish one, conflicts in Africa were considered ‘second-order problems’ given the worsening security situation in Europe. For the French team, on the other hand, developments in Africa merited high attention and were considered immediately relevant to France’s security. The aim of the French team was to curb Russia’s influence and stop the erosion of France’s position in Africa, as well as to maintain a military presence in there.
With regard to the Middle East, the German, Polish, and UK teams saw dealing with Iran as a task on which there could be common ground with a Trump administration, while the French team suggested reviving the Iran nuclear deal together with Germany, the United Kingdom, and possibly China.
‘We did not go boldly enough, fast enough.’
What is to follow from gaming out a failure in Ukraine?
One participant put the main lesson learned in Ukraine as ‘We did not go boldly enough, fast enough’. Faced with the scenario of a defeat for Ukraine and a worsening security situation in Moldova, all four teams were ultimately prepared to credibly deter Russia from interfering by providing Moldova with substantial support, including a military presence as part of a multinational contingent.
Policy Recommendations
1. Keep up the support for Ukraine
Instability in Ukraine makes all of Europe unstable. For a secure Europe, Ukraine needs to prevail as a sovereign democracy, not just to survive. Even a ‘rump state’ with limited scope of action should be supported at all levels – including militarily. European countries should stand firmly against further destabilization attempts by Russia and China, and keep the EU’s door open for Ukraine. They should maintain support for Ukraine even if the United States turns away, and ensure that no deal is made over their head or that of Ukraine.
2. Invest in domestic resilience
The base of a credible foreign and security policy is domestic stability and societal resilience. Investing in strong societies is therefore vital to preparation and reaction to a crisis as severe as the one depicted in the scenario. To reach this goal, European states should focus on funding media literacy programmes, enabling individuals to better detect disinformation, and improved communication between governments and society, as well as reliable and efficient EU mechanisms, especially with regard to migration management.
3. Step up if the United States steps down
Faced with an external threat that is ‘now about survival, not about mere security challenges’, the discussion on European nuclear deterrence would quickly gain momentum. France and the United Kingdom need to assess potential risks to their nuclear programmes in the case of less or no US cooperation. Other European states should engage in conversations with France and the United Kingdom about a European nuclear umbrella for credible and reliable contingency plans. European states should make use of strong bilateral channels with the United States but remain committed to European cohesion first. Contradictions in US foreign policy should be pointed out to Washington while seeking to influence its decision-making as much as possible. Despite facing stark disagreements in policy, European states should stay engaged with the United States, even if only as an end in itself.
4. Ensure European cohesion
European leverage stems from unified action. Preserving and strengthening European unity must be an absolute priority in all foreign policy decisions, especially concerning Europe’s defence posture. In the context of their undeniable dependencies on the United States, European countries should avoid the bilateralization of transatlantic relations. Faced with a weakened NATO, they should counteract the re-nationalization of European security by strengthening a European security pillar – potentially within NATO structures, complementing rather than replacing the alliance. The aim should be close coordination between the EU member states and the United Kingdom.
5. Do not discard the Global South
Despite existential security threats from actors in geographic proximity, it is imperative for Europe to not lose sight of the Global South. Keeping pace with autocratic powers and rebuilding trust with Global South countries must be considered a core European security interest. Potential measures could include investing in agricultural self-sufficiency, an anti-Wagner coalition, bilateral exchanges for better and tailored cooperation, and well-funded efforts to combat disinformation. With regard to China, European states should prepare their economies for further decoupling to cushion heavy repercussions in the long run.
6. Avoid repeating past mistakes
A decisive Russian victory in the war would test Europe’s credibility and scope of action as a foreign policy actor with unprecedented urgency. If Western support for Ukraine were to fail, all efforts should be concentrated on challenging the new status quo and heavily investing in deterring Russia from further imperialist expansion. Besides concerted action to tackle the Russian military-industrial complex, the EU could offer Moldova significant security guarantees, potentially even including the deployment of troops from EU countries and the United Kingdom, and consider strengthening (European) nuclear deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank. However, while acting decisively towards Russia would be essential against the backdrop of the given scenario, it is no less essential in preventing this very scenario.
