Foto: Jann Wilken/Körber-Stiftung

Discussion

The major challenges of our time call for new perspectives, interdisciplinary exchange, and bold ideas. On this page, we bring together key content from the Hamburg Science Summit and make it permanently accessible.

Our insights offer in-depth perspectives on the annual themes of recent years from scientific, political, and societal viewpoints. At the center are the voices of leading actors of the Summit: international experts, decision-makers, and thought leaders from science, business, and politics.

Bettina Rockenbach: How science can strengthen Europe in a multipolar world

Keynote speech at the 2026 Hamburg Science Summit

Dear Maryam Blumenthal,

Dear Eva Nemela,

Dear Participants of the Hamburg Science Summit 2026,

Distinguished colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for the invitation to deliver today’s keynote address. It is a great pleasure and a distinct honor to open the Hamburg Science Summit 2026.

For many years after the end of the Cold War, there was a widespread hope that the world had entered a new era: an era of peaceful cooperation across political boundaries; of growing interdependence; of globalization driven by knowledge, innovation, and exchange; of science as an enabler of prosperity, sustainability, and democratic progress.

Science played a central role in this vision. It connected people where politics had separated them. It opened channels of communication across ideological divides. It helped societies to grow, to modernize, and to address challenges that no nation could solve alone.

Today, we are witnessing the return of great power politics. We are seeing geopolitical rivalry, military aggression, economic coercion, and ideological confrontation. As a result, the international order is under profound strain. The world appears to be becoming more multipolar – or being caught in a growing tension between multipolarity and multilateralism.

We cannot fully predict where this will lead. And precisely because we are scientists, we should be humble about prediction. We must be prepared for different outcomes. But one thing is already clear: the conditions under which science operates have changed fundamentally.

This is our new reality: a world defined increasingly by geopolitical tension, strategic competition, and uncertainty. At the same time, we are facing profound structural challenges at home: the accelerating rise of artificial intelligence; the societal transformations of a digitized world; climate change and demographic shifts; disinformation, polarization, and declining trust in institutions and the state.

In this high-stakes environment, the pressure on science to deliver “tangible results” is mounting. Of course, science must contribute to solving problems. Of course, public investment in research must benefit society. And of course, we must be able to explain why science matters.

But we must be careful not to define “tangible” too narrowly – as immediate economic return, short-term technological application, or measurable output within a political cycle. Some of the most transformative advances in history have emerged from curiosity-driven research, intellectual freedom, long-term investment, and the courage to ask questions whose value was not immediately visible.

If we want innovation, resilience, and strategic capacity, we must not weaken the very foundations from which they emerge. This is why the debate on Europe’s next Research Framework Program, FP10, comes at such a decisive moment.

As negotiations begin, we are defining the budget, governance, and priorities that will shape Europe’s scientific and technological capacity from 2028 onward – and with it, our competitiveness, resilience, and ability to act in the world. Europe cannot afford a mindset that treats science and education as expendable line items. They belong at the top of Europe’s political agenda.

When we debate the future of the European Union one conclusion must stand at the center: science and technology are no longer only academic pursuits. They are among Europe’s most important strategic assets. Science can strengthen Europe in a multipolar world, but only if Europe strengthens science: politically, institutionally, financially, and legally. That also means defending the principles that make science a force for openness, trust, and dialogue.

Our world is confronted with many deeply worrying developments. Recent calls to boycott Israel’s science system from European collaboration show how quickly scientific cooperation can become entangled in political conflict. And we cannot remain silent when scientists, students, and scientific institutions suffer from war, as is the case in Ukraine. Their suffering deserves our solidarity and our humanity. Their resilience deserves our admiration and our support.

Sadly, the examples could go on. But science should not see itself merely as a victim of adverse circumstances. We are not passive observers of this new geopolitical reality. We are actors within it.And we can help ensure that Europe’s strength in this multipolar world remains rooted in the power of science.

Let me highlight three dimensions in which science has proven its strength in practice: first, through diplomacy; second, through innovation; and third, through security and defense.


Ladies and Gentlemen,

In recent years – and especially since Russia’s war on Ukraine – the concept of “Science Diplomacy” has experienced a powerful resurgence.

But let us be honest: Science Diplomacy is neither a new concept, nor is it a magic wand that can solve every geopolitical crisis or do everything it is expected to.

The real challenge of practical Science Diplomacy lies in translation. In translating the distinct approaches of science and diplomacy into joint, strategic action to pursue our common interests.

We cannot afford a vague or naïve Science Diplomacy. We need a framework with a profile, with clear intentions and operational depth, and as a new field of our foreign policy. The European Union’s new Science Diplomacy framework is a step in the right direction. But the real test lies in its implementation.

And let us be realistic: in a European Union where foreign policy remains a fiercely guarded national stronghold, and in a world where diplomacy itself has changed significantly, this implementation will take some effort. On top of that, we need to move fast.

In the scientific community, we should have a candid conversation about what Science Diplomacy can and cannot achieve. We should engage globally with a clear understanding of our role – which includes a sharing of tasks between the scientific and the diplomatic actors.

However, we must also communicate undoubtably where our possibilities and responsibilities end – and where the political responsibilities and possibilities begin. In practice, Science Diplomacy happens when science and diplomacy truly go hand in hand – this is often not a symmetrical relationship, and one must be aware of this.

As Germany’s National Academy, the Leopoldina has practical experience in this field. Since 2014, the Leopoldina has coordinated the Joint Science Conference of the Berlin Process for the Western Balkans – one of Europe’s longest-running science diplomacy initiatives. In a region marked by a difficult history and a fragile political context, this initiative has shown that science can lead where politics often moves slowly – or even blocks and backslides.

The Joint Science Conference brings together academies, universities, research institutions, and young researchers from 16 European countries. The focus of these annual meetings is to address structural challenges facing Southeast Europe: brain drain, academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and scientific excellence. Conclusions feed directly into the annual summits of Heads of State and Government.

This initiative shows that research, education, and innovation are a vital part of the foundation of European convergence, democratic resilience, and economic growth. And this is the understated power of science diplomacy. It builds the intellectual and social fabric of a united Europe long before political treaties are signed.

A second example is Leopoldina’s collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In October, we will hold the third “Science for Future” conference on the interconnectedness of climate change and health, bringing together perspectives from China and Germany. We will discuss the many ways in which climate change affects health and society, including zoonotic diseases.

This example is important for several reasons. First, it reminds us that some challenges are global by nature. Climate change does not stop at borders. Neither do many of its health consequences. Global challenges require global solutions. Second, this example shows that international scientific collaboration remains essential even under conditions of geopolitical tension. China is not simply another partner. It is a major scientific power, a strategic competitor, and in some respects a systemic rival. That makes cooperation more demanding, but not less important. Structured and risk-aware scientific dialogue can help preserve communication and cooperation in areas of shared interest.

Science diplomacy is most powerful when it is both principled and practical – clear-eyed about its limits, yet ambitious in its purpose. For Europe, this means a Science Diplomacy that is strategic, operational, and firmly rooted in scientific freedom, excellence, and integrity. In a divided world, keeping the channels of reason open is not naïve; it is a responsibility.


Ladies and Gentlemen,

My second example of how science can strengthen Europe comes from the field of innovation. No innovation economy is possible without fundamental research. No technological sovereignty without scientific excellence. No security without a deep and resilient knowledge base. And no democratic resilience without independent expertise.

If Europe wants to remain competitive in a world of accelerating technological change, it must understand one central point: breakthroughs do not emerge on command. They emerge from excellent science, from intellectual freedom, from talent, from infrastructures, from openness, from risk-taking, and from the ability to connect discovery with application.

This was also a central theme of the science-policy conference “Towards the European Fifth Freedom and Global Competition: Voices from Science,” which Leopoldina organized in Brussels in June together with the European Research Council.

Let me highlight two central messages from this conference. The first is this: Europe needs a Fifth Freedom. The European Union was built on the free movement of goods, people, services, and capital. But in the 21st century, these four freedoms are no longer enough. Europe must add a Fifth Freedom: the free movement of knowledge.

But this Fifth Freedom must be more than a slogan. It must become a concrete European agenda for the circulation of knowledge, talent, data, infrastructures, technologies, capital, and ideas. This means reducing the very real barriers that still fragment European science and innovation: incompatible rules, fragmented career systems, uneven access to research infrastructures, weak interoperability, and unnecessary administrative burdens. These barriers slow down discovery. They discourage mobility. They prevent ideas from scaling. And they make Europe less attractive in the global competition for talent and innovation.

If Europe wants to remain scientifically strong and globally competitive, the Fifth Freedom must become real in the everyday work of researchers, innovators, entrepreneurs, and institutions.

The second message is closely connected to the first: Europe needs a coherent European Knowledge System. Europe does not lack excellence. It often lacks speed, coherence, and scale to turn excellence into leadership. A true European Knowledge System would connect research, education, innovation, investment, regulation, and industrial capacity so that they reinforce one another instead of remaining trapped in separate policy silos.

This is why the European Research Area, the emerging European Innovation Area, FP10, the European Competitiveness Fund, and related initiatives must be coherent and complementary. Europe should back the areas where it can lead globally, strengthen high[1]performing institutions such as the European Research Council, support excellent ecosystems wherever they exist, and scale promising capacities to critical mass.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In a world shaped by dual-use technologies, geopolitical competition, and foreign interference, research security is no longer a marginal issue. Cyber threats, covert influence, problematic funding constellations, and the risk of unwanted knowledge transfer are all areas of great concern.

It would be irresponsible to ignore these risks. But here, too, Europe must avoid the wrong response. The answer to risk cannot be to close science off from the world. A global research system that is governed primarily by mistrust will ultimately weaken itself.

What Europe needs instead is a concept of responsible openness. Openness remains one of the great strengths of European science. It attracts talent, enables collaboration, and supports excellence. But in the world we live in, openness also requires risk awareness and intelligent safeguards.

We therefore need approaches capable of assessing risks in a differentiated and evidence-based way. Not every scientific field poses the same risks. Not every form of cooperation is equally sensitive. And not every policy instrument is equally appropriate.

This is why the institutional autonomy of academic organizations is so important. Scientific organizations themselves must be able to develop procedures, guidelines, and control mechanisms that are proportionate, informed, and adapted to the realities of research.

In Germany, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) and the Leopoldina have addressed this challenge through the Joint Committee on the Handling of Security Relevant Research. Its basic premise is simple but important: academic freedom and responsibility belong together. Since 2015, the Joint Committee supports German research institutions in identifying and assessing risks that may arise from security[1]relevant research. It promotes structures such as local Committees for Ethics in Security-Relevant Research (KEFs) at universities and research institutions. These committees do not replace export control authorities, legal departments, ministries or security agencies but they provide ethical reflection and case-by-case advice.

This approach has several advantages. It is close to science, respects institutional autonomy and it allows differentiated assessments instead of rigid prohibitions. It helps researchers remain responsible actors rather than passive recipients of external control. Research security should not be understood as the opposite of openness. Properly designed, it is a condition for sustaining openness under more difficult geopolitical circumstances.

This requires a layered system. Researchers need awareness of possible consequences. Universities and research organizations need clear procedures, visible contact points, legal and compliance expertise, export control structures, IT security and ethical advice. Governments should provide reliable information about geopolitical risks, sanctions and security threats while respecting academic freedom and institutional autonomy. In order to close the latter information gap, Germany is about to establish a National Platform for Research Security being fully operational by spring 2027.

Research security is about enabling Europe to cooperate wisely: as open as possible, as protected as necessary. Responsible openness is informed, reflective, institutionally supported and ethically grounded.


Ladies and gentlemen,

At this moment, science in Europe faces a heavy, yet not impossible choice.

We can retreat into a defensive posture – protecting what remains, seeking safe niches, and hoping that our institutions will withstand the pressures of a polarized world. Or we can choose a more ambitious path. This other path will require adjustment, courage, and sustained effort, it will require the reconsideration and modernization of fundamental frameworks.

For me, the choice is clear. Europe must strengthen its scientific capacity while defending the freedom, excellence, and breadth of research that make science truly powerful. Europe must not lower its ambitions at the very moment when Europeans and the world demand more from us. A strong Europe needs free science. And free science needs a strong Europe.

Photo: Anna Kolata | Leopoldina

Prof. Dr. Bettina Rockenbach

President, German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina

Mona Nemer: Science can tell us what is happening – it does not tell us what to do

This interview was first published in the 2026 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Professor Nemer, as Canada’s Chief Science Advisor, you work at the intersection of science and government. What makes scientific advice useful to policymakers – without compromising its independence?

Policymakers receive advice from many sources, often reflecting particular interests. Independent science advice, on the other hand, provides an objective assessment of the evidence grounded in rigorous research and reliable data. It also requires an understanding of the decision at hand, and should draw on the best available evidence, be clear about uncertainties and limitations, and help policymakers understand the implications of the evidence. Trust and good communication are essential. This became apparent during the pandemic. Working closely with my international counterparts, we identified emerging issues and the science needed – from how the virus spread and how to detect it, to how it infected humans and what interventions could limit its spread and health impacts. We also succeeded in getting researchers and publishers to make covid-19 research openly accessible, which further supported knowledge-informed advice in real time.

We often hear concerns about policymakers ignoring science. But there is also the opposite risk: that politicians shift responsibility onto science, suggesting that “there is no alternative”. Where should we draw the line between where scientific advice ends and political judgement begins?

The distinction between the roles of science advisers and politicians is essential to a healthy democracy. Science can tell us what is happening, what could happen, the likely consequences of different choices, and what solutions may be possible. It does not tell us what to do. Science can assess the risks of a disease or the likely effects of an environmental policy. But deciding which risks society is prepared to accept or which interests should take precedence rests with elected politicians. A science adviser’s role is to provide the evidence and clarify the uncertainties and trade-offs. Politicians, in turn, should not use science to avoid responsibility – they should be able to explain what informed their decisions. Science is an important input into decision-making, and a better understanding of it helps the public distinguish evidence from political judgement and hold decision-makers accountable.

Science advice is becoming increasingly entangled with questions of national security and economic competition. How does this new environment affect the role of scientific advisors?

Science and technology are increasingly linked to prosperity, national security and sovereignty, from AI and quantum technologies to biotechnology, energy and critical infrastructure. For science advisors, this creates a more complex environment. We must recognize the strategic importance of knowledge and technology while preserving the openness and international collaboration on which scientific progress depends. This makes independent science advice more important, not less. Advisors must be able to identify opportunities and risks without being driven by political or commercial interests. Research security is essential to protect sensitive data and knowledge, but it should not justify scientific isolationism. We need to distinguish between knowledge that should remain open and capabilities that require protection. In a more competitive world, governments need trusted science advice that is candid – even when it is inconvenient.

Mona Nemer

Chief Science Adviser to the Government of Canada

Enrico Letta: The EU’s Single Market is more than just a technical project

This interview was first published in the 2024 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Dr Letta, you recently wrote a major report to the European Council on the European Union’s Single Market. What makes the Single Market so important for the EU’s competitiveness?

The Single Market is more than just a technical project; it is a fundamental political initiative that drives growth, prosperity, and solidarity across Europe. It enables the EU to achieve strategic objectives such as the green and digital transitions, EU enlargement, and enhanced defense capabilities. By fostering an integrated market, it allows the EU to mobilize private and public resources more effectively, creating a robust financing framework for its ambitious goals. Moreover, the Single Market supports job creation, innovation, and the scalability of EU businesses, enhancing their ability to compete globally and negotiate favorable trade agreements​.

In your report, you argue that research and innovation should be introduced as a “fifth freedom” within the Single Market. What would such a fifths freedom look like?

The Single Market, traditionally defined by the four freedoms – movement of people, goods, services, and capital – relies on 20th-century principles that no longer fully capture the complexities of a market transformed by digitalization, innovation, and the pressures of climate change. The lines between goods and services have blurred, merging in ways that challenge the old distinctions and overlook the nuances of the digital and circular economies. Therefore, adding a fifth freedom to the previous ones is an indispensable extension of the established framework. This fifth freedom should encompass several fields, among which research, innovation, data, competences, knowledge and education. It would place these drivers at the heart of the Single Market, creating an ecosystem where the spread of knowledge boosts economic growth, societal progress, and cultural development. Focus on this action should be central in the next legislative term, with the aim of positioning the EU at the edge of technological transformations.

Europe has its strengths in basic research, but struggles to translate scientific excellence into marketable innovations. Could the changes in the Single Market help to bridge this research-to-practice gap?

Enhancing the Single Market can indeed bridge the gap between Europe’s scientific strengths and its ability to create marketable innovations. Simplifying the regulatory framework and introducing a European Code of Business Law would unify the market and reduce administrative burdens, making it easier for businesses to operate and innovate. Additionally, creating a more competitive industrial strategy and supporting the scalability of EU companies would facilitate the transition from research to practical, marketable innovations. These measures would ultimately boost the EU’s competitiveness on the global stage, ensuring that Europe remains at the forefront of technological and economic progress. With these improvements, the Single Market can become a powerful engine of innovation and growth, securing a prosperous future for the entire European Union.

Photo: Körber-Stiftung/Jann Wilken

Enrico Letta

Former Prime Minister of Italy, President of the Jacques Delors Institute

Michiel Scheffer: Policymakers should put the money and the rules where their mouth is

This interview was first published in the 2026 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Dr Scheffer, it is often said that Europe is home to excellent science, yet fails to create world-leading innovations. Where along the innovation pathway does Europe lose its momentum – and how can this be fixed?

Europe loses its innovation momentum in the scaling up, because of three limiting factors. First, Europe is still a fragmented market, both in a regulatory sense and in demand pull. Public procurement lacks critical mass and leading corporations in the EU are locked-in in an incremental innovation set. Second, Europe faces a lack of capital to scale up – also as we have regulated 27 financial markets, and therefore lack the pooling of seavings and pensions in larger investment funds. Finally, the EU still has industrial strengths, but is loosing it – also by a too low number of graduates in technical schools. But the situation is not hopeless. The EU has leading manufacturing sectors and the political arena is aware of the issues. Policymakers should now put the money and the rules where their mouth is: boost the single market, promote innovative public procurement and foster a capital and savings union.

Public funding for breakthrough innovation requires a willingness to invest in ideas that may never succeed – risking millions in taxpayers’ money. Are Europe’s policymakers, and ultimately the public, prepared to embrace that reality?

Funding innovation implies creating a funnel of instruments from fundamental research to industrialization. The EU and many countries and regions have created such funnels that start by funding crazy ideas but selecting those conducted with determination and skill to the next stage. And the funding instruments should evolve from grants to equity and from equity to loans while asking more private engagement from one level of technology readiness to the next one. And let’s not forget that inaction also carries risks. It is better to invest in the real economy in the pensions for tomorrow than in real estate.

Many technologies make it through the research and start-up phases but struggle to scale. Beyond providing more capital, what else is needed to help European scale-ups succeed?

We have lived in a neo-liberal era of government intervention limited to addressing market failure. In a period of economic transition change is often a market failure. Beyond that Europe has a myriad of challenges: war at its borders and a redesign of defensive alliance, climate change and major threats to industry, transport and agriculture, AI and the need to boost productivity, and an ageing population demanding healthcare. EU needs a real mission driven strategy in which governments defend the common good and take ownership of missions.

Photo: European Commission

Michiel Scheffer

President of the Board, European Innova tion Council (EIC)

Maria Leptin: The most transformative breakthroughs come from curiosity-driven research

This interview was first published in the 2025 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Professor Leptin, as the debate around the next framework programme FP10 gains momentum, questions arise about the ERC’s role in the broader innovation agenda. How can frontier research contribute to Europe’s innovation capacity while maintaining the ERC’s core mission of scientific excellence?

Science and technological innovation are tightly intertwined – but innovation is not linear. The most transformative breakthroughs are often unpredictable and come from curiosity-driven research. This is why bottom-up research, selected only for its scientific excellence, is critical. The ERC supports precisely this kind of frontier science. While other funding programmes come with predefined priorities, the ERC lets researchers explore the unknown, often generating discoveries that later contribute to EU priorities. Without this complementary role, FP10 risks prioritising incremental results and missing out on transformative breakthroughs.

Moreover, frontier research is also a training ground for Europe’s knowledge workforce. So far, ERC projects have hosted more than 100,000 team members, mainly PhD students and postdocs – Europe’s next generation of professionals, skilled in cutting-edge methods and technologies. Policy-driven and exploratory research complement each other, but long-term competitive advantage and societal resilience depend on the open-ended, bottom-up research the ERC champions.

The ERC has become a global benchmark for scientific excellence. But many research institutions struggle with long-term funding, bureaucracy and fragmented careers. What structural conditions are needed to make Europe truly attractive for world-class science?

Research investment, career prospects and systemic barriers remain key issues. President Ursula von der Leyen has recently proposed ambitious plans for the next long-term budget, stating that “an investment in science is an investment in our future”. But the EU cannot do it alone. National governments must also strengthen their commitment to R&I investments to reduce disparities across countries and to strengthen Europe. Reforms of academic careers – especially perspectives for independent careers – are critical for making research professions more attractive. Finally, we need to address systemic barriers such as reliable data accessibility. Centralised and accessible European data infrastructures, supported by harmonised regulation and dedicated financial resources, must become a strategic priority.

Looking ahead ten years: What would success look like for the European Research Area – and what role should the ERC play in shaping that vision?

The European Research Area is the ambition to create a single, borderless market for research, innovation and technology across the EU. We strongly support this ambition. As the ERC, we listen to the community, and try to lead through our policies, for instance by recognising diversity in career achievements. The ERC also shapes Europe’s research landscape by creating a pan-European competition of ideas and people, and by setting a benchmark for excellence.

Europe has great potential, but we cannot take progress for granted. Complex geopolitics, shifting policy priorities, increasing fragmentation, and budgetary constraints all pose real risks. One sign of success would be if European researchers, as well as students could really move freely across borders without constraints to their academic and personal progress. Europe needs to be a leader – not a follower – if it is to achieve its ambitions.

Photo: EMBL PhotoLab 2

Maria Leptin

President of the European Research Council (ERC). Chair of the ERC Scientific Council

Josef Aschbacher: Cooperation works best when it is built on strength, not dependence

This interview was first published in the 2026 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Dr Aschbacher, while space has been a field of international cooperation since the end of the Cold War, it is once again being shaped by geopolitics. How can we preserve dialogue and collaboration in times of political tension?

Cooperation works best when it is built on strength, not dependence. And space is a good example of that. Europe will always work closely with the United States. NASA has been a trusted partner for decades and will always remain so. But recent developments have reminded us that partners can change priorities. That is normal. It is also a wake-up call for Europe. Today, the United States, China and Russia all have independent human spaceflight capabilities. Europe does not. Yet our economy, industry and talent base are comparable. For me, the lesson is clear: Europe needs its own capabilities and its own human access to space. Strategic autonomy is not the opposite of international cooperation. It is what allows Europe to be a stronger and more attractive partner.

Today, commercial actors play an increasingly important role in space. How should the role of public institutions evolve? Are there areas of responsibility that should remain in public hands?

When I entered the space sector, almost everything was driven by public investment. Today, private companies are transforming the sector, and that is a very positive development. Space is one of the fastest-growing sectors in the world, expanding by around 10% per year. It is becoming increasingly important not only for our economy, but also for security and defence. Public institutions therefore have a crucial role to play. They must invest in future technologies, create market opportunities and help companies grow. At the same time, Europe must retain control over strategic capabilities such as launchers, navigation, secure communications, Earth observation and space science. Those are fundamental to our sovereignty and security.

As space becomes more commercialised, more contested and more crowded, the existing international rules are being put to the test. How can Europe shape the future governance of space?

Today, we are entering a new chapter. The United States is moving fast. China has a very clear long-term strategy. Other countries are increasing their ambitions as well. The question for Europe is simple: do we want to help shape this future, or do we want others to shape it for us? Those who build the future of space will also help define its rules. When I was seven years old, I watched the Moon landing. It inspired an entire generation. Exploration is not only about technology. Space can inspire and unite Europe, attract and retain our best talent, and help European companies and industry flourish. Europe has the talent, the industry and the technology. We have demonstrated this through programmes such as Copernicus, Galileo and some of the world’s most ambitious scientific missions exploring the solar system and the universe. What we need now is to match that level of ambition in other domains as well, such as space exploration.

Photo: International Science Council

Josef Aschbacher

Director-General of the European Space Agency (ESA)

Peter Gluckman: It is in a country’s own interest to collaborate with others

This interview was first published in the 2026 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Professor Gluckman, science and technology have become closely intertwined with geopolitics. Against this background, you have recently argued that science diplomacy must move “from utopia to pragmatism”. What would a more pragmatic approach look like in practice?

Science is inevitably intertwined with technology, economics, security, and power – all the more so in an age of rapid technological change, where the links between security, power and technology are becoming increasingly clear. While there has always been a desire to achieve a utopian world in which national interests are subsumed under global interests, the reality is that governments and their diplomatic representatives work primarily to advance national interests. This is despite important global commons and goals, including much of the sustainability agenda. What is needed is an understanding that it is in a country’s own interest to coordinate and collaborate with others on issues confronting the global commons. This shifts the argument towards a more pragmatic perspective that is more likely to get traction.

How should countries decide where scientific cooperation should continue despite political differences – and where security interests should be prioritised?

Clearly, security interests will always define the boundaries of scientific collaboration in some areas. The challenge is that these boundaries are now fuzzy, given today’s unstable and multipolar world and the range of technological advances. This is further confounded by political and often public demands to protect private sector interests. But the fact remains that politically driven barriers can only impede progress on issues that confront the global commons.

What role can international scientific organisations such as the International Science Council play in science diplomacy today? Where can they add value beyond what governments and formal diplomatic channels are able to do?

Scientific collaborations can cross geographical and political boundaries – particularly as science is the nearest we have to a universal language. The International Science Council works across national boundaries to facilitate scientific collaboration and build shared understanding. We can support diplomatic objectives, make the case for transnational coordination and collaboration, and enable discussions that might be inhibited in more formal settings. Organisations such as the International Science Council can also partner with multilateral and plurilateral structures to bring governmental and non-governmental perspectives together. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, science organisations can make the case for protecting regional and global commons.

Photo: Philippe Sebirot

Peter Gluckman

President of the International Science Council

Manuel Heitor: Europe needs to Align, Act, Accelerate Research and Innovation

This interview was first published in the 2025 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Professor Heitor, in your report Align, Act, Accelerate you argue that disruptive innovation is unlikely to emerge from the EU’s conventional funding system. What needs to change to foster breakthrough innovation?

The report must be read in the context of the current geopolitical situation – over three years into the war in Ukraine and with a new US administration in place. Alongside the Letta, Draghi and Niinistö reports, it underscores the need for Europe to unite its forces: we must accelerate our collective response to geopolitical threats, boost innovation in defence and security, and rethink our understanding of “science for policy”.

Europe is the world’s most reliable partner – and the most efficient in terms of outputs per resources, thanks to our diversity. While investment capacities still lag behind, we now have a unique opportunity to advance research and innovation towards strategic autonomy on a world level. President von der Leyen’s ReARM EU initiative and the Union Strategy on Preparedness mark key steps in this direction. We must also reform our funding system to promote greater risk-taking, faster decisions, and institutional tolerance for failure. The ERC and EIC remain essential, but additional mechanisms are needed.

You propose a dedicated experimental unit within the European Commission to test new instruments and faster funding. What could such a unit look like in practice?

We all are facing an accelerating pace of technological change, in times of abundance of knowledge. New instruments are essential, inspired by models such as Germany’s SPRIN-D and the UK’s ARIA. An Experimental Unit under the EIC could assess and test novel funding mechanisms, many already piloted by private foundations. It could also help attract more private investment through co-funding, especially in areas like industrial greening and food security. Additionally, it should develop effective tools for technology monitoring – a crucial capacity in times of rapid transformation – with strong private sector involvement. The aim is not to replace existing structures, but to complement them with agile, risk-tolerant approaches.

Innovation is increasingly seen as a key factor for strategic autonomy and competitiveness. What role should the next European Framework Programme (FP10) play to position Europe as a leader in science-based transformation?

An effective European research and innovation ecosystem – including a European Defence and Research Area, as recently proposed by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre – will require coordinated efforts on multiple fronts. FP10 must be strengthened and restructured around four interconnected spheres: competitive excellence, industrial competitiveness, societal challenges, and a more robust innovation ecosystem.

Europe must escape the “mid-tech trap” by prioritizing high added-value technologies such as AI, space systems, advanced materials, quantum and robotics. A stronger, more unified public procurement system at the EU level is needed to scale innovation, alongside a cohesion policy that fosters defence, security and space-related supply chains across all regions. At the global level, Europe must pursue tailored partnerships – including with the US, China, India and Brazil – while adopting a more targeted approach to research security, based on project-level evaluation rather than top-down controls.

Photo: private

Manuel Heitor

Professor at IST Lisbon – University of Lisbon, Centre for Innovation, Technology and Policy Research. Former Minister of Science, Technology and Higher Education, Portugal (2015-2022)

Sheila Jasanoff: Erasing uncomfortable truths is never the answer

This interview was first published in the 2025 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Professor Jasanoff, you have been a leading figure in Science and Technology Studies since the 1980s. Looking back, how has the way we talk about science evolved over the years – especially in policy-relevant fields such as climate research?

It is striking how little the public discourse on science for policy has changed in spite of our growing scholarly understanding of the social foundations of knowledge-making. The dominant view still remains that science represents nature and policy should follow science. One problem with this view is that it brackets off science as an ivory tower activity and absolves society at large of any responsibility for generating knowledge about its own condition. Political authorities are then at liberty to shut down lines of research they don’t like, thereby creating a regime of self-inflicted ignorance.

A different picture emerges from Science and Technology Studies. We would recognize that knowledge and its uptake are co-produced—that is, “we the people” accept certain topics and ways of knowing because we are actively committed to exploring the endpoints of knowledge: whether the distant origins of the universe or the causes of climate change. This perspective embraces science as an ongoing expression of society’s best interests, and hence not to be shut down on the political whims of the moment.

In a recent interview with DIE ZEIT, you described the United States as being caught in a “civil war of ideas” since the Trump era. What do you mean by this – and how does it affect the role of science in public policy?

At the risk of oversimplifying, the “civil war” is between those who see scientific knowledge as a search for truth divorced from politics and those who see science as a powerful vessel for incubating particular forms of politics and ideology. Right now, in the United States, we seem to be in the grip of the “it’s all politics” framing, enabling those in power to erase knowledge created by their perceived opponents. The attacks have centered on knowledge that we might call cosmopolitan, that is, knowledge which makes us more inclined to take responsibility for our neighbors’ problems. I mean areas such as climate research, pandemic preparedness, global hunger and poverty, mental health, or social diversity.

Policy needs science as much as science needs policy, and erasing uncomfortable truths is never the answer. At the same time, putting politics back into science policy could have beneficial consequences. It might force scientists to justify the value of what they do, so more people will buy in – not because science is value-free but because science is how we best know ourselves.

We are seeing growing political pressure on science in the US, which has also fueled debates in Europe about encouraging American researchers to move across the Atlantic. In your view, how should Europeans respond to the current situation?

It is tempting to say that Europe is doing a good thing in wooing American researchers because fine minds should be offered the best possible support, and right now the United States is less hospitable to science than Europe is. After all, this just reverses the many episodes of brain drain that have affected European science, not just from Germany in the mid-20th century but also from Thatcher’s Britain in the 1980s.

However, I can’t help feeling that this moment calls for more than just incentives for the fortunate scientists who are mobile enough to benefit from international recruitment. I would like to see European science institutions join together to articulate a set of norms that would help guard against abuses of power by political authorities who dislike uncomfortable truths. We should recognize as a global community that scientific ideas are not just commodities for sale to the highest bidder, but that free inquiry is a human right and should be defended as such by the entire scientific world.

Photo: Martha Stewart

Sheila Jasanoff

Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies, Harvard University, Director, Program on Science, Technology and Society, Harvard Kennedy School

Markus Dressel: Science and democracy: how deep is their love?

This essay was first published in the 2026 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Science and democracy appear to be made for each other. Both value openness, criticism, and the freedom to question established beliefs. Recent attacks on academic freedom have reinforced this impression: when democracy comes under pressure, science often comes under pressure with it. Conversely, calls to defend academic freedom are often calls to defend democracy at the same time. Science and democracy, it seems, are an inseparable couple.

But how deep is that love really? When the ancient Greeks developed early forms of democracy, they had philosophy – but not science in the modern sense. When the first democratic constitutions were introduced in Europe and America, modern science was still far from the institution it is today. Conversely, remarkable scientific advances have been made under systems that were hardly democratic. Copernicus worked in early modern Europe, Robert Koch in Wilhelminian Germany, and Dmitri Mendeleev developed the periodic table in Tsarist Russia. And of course, there is present-day China: a scientific powerhouse – and an authoritarian state.

This does not mean that the relationship between science and democracy should not be taken seriously. On the contrary, there are good reasons why the two are often perceived as a couple. But things are more complicated. Their relationship depends not only on historical circumstances; it also – and more fundamentally – depends on how we conceive of their respective roles: How much political influence should science have? Which matters should be reserved to democratic choice? And ultimately, how should the division of labour be organised between science and politics? The complexity, then, stems from the fact that there is more than one plausible answer to these questions.

Follow the science: the technocratic view

Sixty years ago, Jürgen Habermas proposed three such answers: a technocratic model, in which scientific evidence largely determines policy; a decisionist model, in which political decision-making retains primacy over scientific evidence; and a pragmatist model, in which science and policy – as well as facts and values – are closely entangled. This distinction has proved remarkably persistent, and elements of the three models appear again and again in today’s debates on science and democracy.

The technocratic view is perhaps the most straightforward: follow the science. If good decision-making depends on the evidence, why should those who best understand the evidence not have a particularly strong say? In many fields, science is the most reliable source of knowledge we have, from health to emerging technologies to global warming. It seems logical, then, that political decisions in these fields should be guided by scientific expertise.

Technocracy has a point. Not only would it be a bad idea to vote on whether smoking can cause cancer or whether anthropogenic climate change exists, knowledge of these facts can also dramatically improve political decisions – which, in the long run, can improve quality of life for all. This is why technocracy is one possible answer to the question of how science relates to democracy: if and when the scientific evidence is clear, science-guided policy can yield better outcomes for the benefit of the public.

Why, then, does technocracy have such a bad reputation? The answer is threefold. For one, it risks reducing politics to administration: if science determines the right course of action, there is little left for elected representatives to decide – or to be held accountable for. For another, it risks making democratic debate redundant. Why should the public and members of parliament engage in political deliberation if there are no legitimate alternatives? Finally, political decisions inevitably involve values – judgements about what should be the case, rather than what is the case. And while scientists can help us understand the latter, their expertise gives them no special authority to determine the former.

Policy-relevant, not prescriptive: the decisionist view

This is where the decisionist model comes in. It suggests a clear division of labour: science should provide evidence, but decisions should be made – and be accounted for – by democratically elected policymakers. While scientists may tell us, for instance, how certain climate policies are likely to affect the climate, they should refrain from the political activity of advocating for one policy over another. This is famously captured in the IPCC’s principle of being policy-relevant, but not policy-prescriptive.

The advantages of this view are obvious. By leaving authority to elected policymakers, it ensures that those making the decisions can also be held accountable for them. It also leaves room for genuine democratic debate. After all, the very idea of a decision implies that there are alternatives to choose from – irrespective of whether scientists support the eventual choice. And since choosing between alternatives inevitably involves values and interests, the decisionist model leaves these choices where they belong in a democracy: with the citizenry and its democratically legitimated representatives.

Does this settle the question of how science relates to democracy? If only it were that easy. One problem is that science itself is not entirely value-free: values shape which questions are asked, how scientific uncertainty is assessed, and how to proceed when more than one hypothesis is compatible with the evidence. Another problem is that scientific findings can feed back into political values. Evidence about the likely consequences of a certain policy may give us reasons to reconsider not only the policy – but also the values that motivated it in the first place. Paradoxically, if science strictly refrains from engaging with value-laden questions, it may end up withholding knowledge that is highly relevant to democratic debate.

Mutual learning: the pragmatist view

When Habermas introduced what he called the pragmatist model, he argued that it could not only overcome the problems of the other two models – but also that it was the only one with an intrinsic affinity with democracy. The basic idea is that science and politics are neither separate spheres, nor does one dominate the other. Instead, they should be seen as deeply entangled: science may lead us to reconsider our values, while our values, in turn, shape the way scientists ask questions, assess uncertainty, and evaluate hypotheses. This mutual learning, the argument goes, requires ongoing deliberation between scientists, policymakers, and a range of societal stakeholders – making science and democracy indeed look like a natural couple.

This view has become highly influential. Many approaches, from transdisciplinary research to co-production, share its emphasis on mutual learning and stakeholder involvement. And for good reason: involving different perspectives can reveal knowledge, values, and unintended consequences that scientists or policymakers alone might overlook. This can make policy both more evidence-based and more democratic. And it can result in what has been called socially robust knowledge: knowledge that is not only scientifically sound, but also responsive to the concerns, needs and realities of society.

But these benefits come at a price. Science-policy deliberations are slow and expensive, especially when accompanied by stakeholder participation. They may also add little when the evidence is already clear or when there is broad political consensus. More importantly, the strong emphasis on values may mislead us into thinking that facts and values are indistinguishable, or that there is no difference between science and any other form of knowledge. Taken too far, the pragmatist view risks weakening the autonomy of science and, with it, precisely what science can contribute to democracy: independent, reliable, and sometimes inconvenient truths.

The best of all worlds – the pluralistic view

So, how deep is the love between science and democracy really? As in most relationships, the true answer is: it’s complicated. Despite their apparent contradictions, all three views capture something important about why science and democracy make such a good match. Technocracy reminds us that democracy depends on reliable knowledge that does not care about political majorities; decisionism reminds us that scientific expertise does not imply authority over genuinely normative questions; pragmatism reminds us that science is neither entirely value-free nor absolutely all-knowing.

These approaches may pull in different directions, but they do not necessarily exclude one another. In cases where scientific uncertainty is low and value disputes are unlikely, it is quite plausible for decisions to be driven by experts – especially when they need to be made quickly. In other cases, there may be legitimate value disputes about what the evidence means for society. While anthropogenic climate change, for instance, is an indisputable scientific fact, how the burdens of climate policies should be shared, or how much should be invested in mitigation, adaptation, or negative-emission technologies, are political questions that should be left to elected policymakers. Yet other cases may require stronger interaction between scientists, stakeholders, and policymakers – particularly when scientific uncertainty is high, value perspectives diverge, and the issue at hand has far-reaching consequences for society.

We should therefore resist the temptation to single out one model as the right relation for science and democracy. Instead, we should embrace a pluralistic approach that combines elements of all three – depending on the question at hand, the degree of uncertainty, the values involved, and the urgency of the decision. This makes the relationship between science and democracy complicated, but that may be precisely why it works. Democracies are particularly good at accommodating different forms of authority, competing values, and legitimate disagreement without requiring one of them to prevail in every situation. Science and democracy, then, may not be the simple love story they first appear to be. But perhaps their ability to live with complexity is exactly what makes them such a good match.

Photo: Claudia Höhne

Markus Dressel

Programme Director International Science, Körber-Stiftung

Stephanie Wehner: The ultimate form of communication allowed by nature

This interview was first published in the 2025 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Professor Wehner, quantum networks promise applications that go far beyond the capabilities of classical networks. What fascinates you about the quantum internet – and how do you envision its most transformative applications?

On a fundamental level, I am fascinated by the idea that it would allow us to use an entirely new form of communication: quantum communication. If we believe that nature is governed by quantum mechanics, then this is the ultimate form of communication allowed by nature. It has very different properties from what we are used to – like the fact that quantum information cannot be copied. What’s more, two remote quantum bits can be in a special state called entanglement. This forms a fundamentally unsharable connection, enabling a kind of coordination that is impossible with any classical technology.

Historically, accessing new forms of communication has had a major impact on society. There are already several example applications that illustrate how these unusual properties can help solve problems that are otherwise impossible or inefficient to tackle. For instance, quantum communication can provide security against any eavesdropper – even one equipped with a quantum computer now or in the future – because entanglement forms a fundamentally private connection.


As Director of the Quantum Internet Alliance, you are leading Europe’s effort to realize a prototype quantum internet by 2030. Why is it strategically important for Europe to invest in quantum networking?

There are fundamentally two reasons. First, the economic one. Quantum networking is already known to have interesting applications, so it’s an important future technology. The Draghi report shows that the GDP gap between the EU and the US widened from 15% in 2002 to 30% today, with 70% of that gap due to a productivity shortfall – largely because Europe didn’t lead in the first digital revolution. While we don’t yet know the full size of the future quantum industry, large investments outside Europe show that this technology will be developed. The question is whether Europe can turn its R&D lead into innovation and economic return.

Second, security. Although quantum internet technology supports many applications, one is untappable communication. This is being developed outside Europe – for example, in China. Failing to build European quantum communication technologies would mean relying on non-European security in the future. So it is vital that Europe not only supports quantum networking research, but also pushes to bring it from the lab to the field, developing a strong ecosystem and delivering to real users.


With the Körber Prize, you receive one of Europe’s most prestigious science awards. How do you plan to use the €1 million in prize funds – and how might your work contribute to research and European industry?

I am very humbled and excited by the award. I hope to use its visibility to highlight the large collaborative effort needed to make quantum internet technology a success with and for Europe. We are in a strong scientific position, but it is crucial that academia and industry work together. I will continue to support this via the Quantum Internet Alliance, where we are building a prototype quantum internet in a large European collaboration. I plan to use most of the prize funds to discover new applications of quantum networking – applications that can make this technology genuinely useful to society. I am driven by the idea that quantum communication can and should be used by all – and new applications are key to that goal.

Photo: Marcus Gloger/Körber-Stiftung

Stephanie Wehner

Antoni van Leeuwenhoek Professor in quantum information, Delft University of Technology Director, Quantum Internet Alliance

Maria Cristina Russo: Research and innovation are at the core of Europe’s prosperity

This interview was first published in the 2024 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Ms Russo, the European Commission’s new political guidelines put a strong emphasis on science and research. How does this priority influence your strategic agenda for the coming years?

Research and innovation are at the core of the EU’s prosperity. At the Directorate-General, we focus on critical and strategic areas such as AI, biotechnologies, advanced materials, or clean tech. Through R&I, Europe should develop and apply cutting-edge technologies in priority areas that make its role globally indispensable in value chains and in key industries. This requires strategic choices based on evidence, foresight on the development of specific technologies and an understanding of the EU’s position at the global level. At the same time, R&I needs an overarching framework to be successful. An attractive environment for industrial research is also necessary to boost private investments. As highlighted by Enrico Letta in his report to the European Council, fostering a more innovation-friendly regulatory environment, shaping international standards and increasing the mobility of talent and skills should be priorities. This can be achieved by introducing a “fifth freedom” in Europe, dedicated to the free movement of research, innovation, knowledge and education.

Collaboration between academia and business could be the key to translating Europe’s scientific strengths into marketable innovations. How can we build and support effective cooperation between these sectors in Europe?

A systemic change to better connect science, industry, policy and society is required to improve the valorisation of research results across the Union. A new legal framework for enhancing intellectual asset management could be established to accelerate market uptake and the industrial and commercial scale-up of innovation. Specific obligations to exploit knowledge valorisation in Europe beyond the current “best effort” should be envisaged. We will also explore the need for an intermediary to centralise and manage scattered patent rights. Standards play a pivotal strategic role, serving as the silent foundation of our Single Market, ensuring a high level of safety, functionality and interoperability for EU materials and products. To support our strategic choices in industrial R&I and the valorisation of research and innovation results, it is essential to have appropriate standards. Standards guarantee adherence to policy and legal objectives and can facilitate access to global markets.

Artificial intelligence could be another key driver of innovation. But AI could also change science itself. What are your expectations for the future impact of AI on research processes?

To increase Europe’s competitiveness, we need to accelerate the responsible integration of AI into science. This is existential for the future of Europe’s leadership in research and innovation, as well as a strategic edge in the global AI race. AI in science will help our researchers to speed up innovation and the subsequent market deployment of new technologies. We are talking about technologies that impact our health, our climate and our competitiveness in the world. Together with stakeholders, we have already developed guidelines for the responsible use of AI in science. In April 2024, our Scientific Advice Mechanism issued an opinion on the uptake of AI in research and innovation. We will keep making efforts to ensure that scientists in the EU have access to the proper tools to enable them fully to tap into the potential of AI in science. This has also been highlighted by President von der Leyen in the political guidelines for the next Commission, which call for the setup of a European AI Research Council.

Photo: Körber-Stiftung/Jann Wilken

Maria Cristina Russo

Deputy Director-General, DG for Research and Innovation, European Commission

Uwe Cantner: Germany needs a New Mission Orientation in research and innovation

This interview was first published in the 2024 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Professor Cantner, last year the German Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation, which you chair, called for a Zeitenwende in innovation policy. What exactly do you mean by that?

With our call for a Zeitenwende in research and innovation policy, we urge the German Federal Government to change the nature of its R&I policy in line with the transformation towards sustainability and in relation to future key technologies. Radical technological innovations characterize transformations such as the shift to non-fossil engines in the automotive industry. And they provoke profound economic and social change. The traditional approach to R&I policy does not do justice to this nature of transformation: it neither explicitly aims to promote radical innovation, nor does it take the resulting structural change into account. The new style of R&I policy that we are calling for, the New Mission Orientation, is set up differently: radical technological changes are a clear goal, accompanied by social innovations; strategies and measures are developed and implemented across ministries; policy instruments are regularly evaluated; market forces for problem solving are emphasized; and social compensation for those disadvantaged by change is considered from the outset.

For decades, the German model was to refine existing technologies rather than develop new ones. Has “German incrementalism” had its day?

“German incrementalism” refers to the ability of German industry to refine technologies, products, processes and services through incremental steps, leading to perfection and sophistication. In recent decades, the German economy has relied very successfully on these outstanding skills. But they are less relevant today. Rather than incremental improvements, we need radical changes towards a greener economy and towards future key technologies. However, German companies are finding it difficult to implement such changes. In digitalization, for example, the German economy is falling behind in international rankings and is now below the EU average. Likewise, German automobile companies, only slowly switching to non-fossil vehicles, lose international competitiveness. A strong push for technological reorientation across the entire spectrum of German industry is required. If successful, “German incrementalism” will have its day again and will help to improve the international competitiveness of German companies – no longer in traditional technologies, but in future key technologies as well as in technologies addressing climate change.

Europe has long relied on Germany’s economic strength. Now the growth engine is faltering. Does Germany need to improve for Europe to prosper again?

There are several reasons why Germany, the growth engine, has stalled. In addition to inflation, interest rate policy, protectionism and excessive bureaucracy, it is above all a growing technological gap in future technologies. German innovation activities do not keep pace with developments at the world technology frontier. There are warning signals Germany must take very seriously: Not only is Germany technologically falling behind on a world scale – Korea, Japan, China and the US are ahead – it is also falling behind within the EU, especially when it comes to digital technologies. The latter tendency indicates that other European economies have redirected their innovation and production activities earlier and are already showing economic success. The previously strongest EU economy has so far failed to do so. Hence, Germany must first do its homework by redirecting innovation activities from traditional, established areas to the key technologies of the future. With every step that Germany climbs up the EU rankings, its power to drive Europe forward will return.

Photo: Anne Günther/FSU

Uwe Cantner

Chair, German Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation (EFI)

Henning Kroll: Europe's technological sovereignty: Where do we stand?

This interview was first published in the 2024 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Europe’s challenges in times of geopolitical shift

Over the past decades, global collaboration has been the basis for major technological advances in Europe and beyond. In today’s rapidly changing world, however, Europe’s technological sovereignty can no longer be taken for granted.

On the one hand, the rise of China has fundamentally shifted the balance of power in the global innovation system. In the mid-2000s, Europe accounted for almost 40% of all patent applications in then relevant technology areas, such as advanced manufacturing. In today’s key enabling technologies, such as artificial intelligence, in contrast, Europe’s contribution amounts to a mere 15%. Even if these differences appear less striking in other areas, they are indicative of the substantive relative loss of importance that Europe has been facing in recent years.

On the other hand, geopolitical developments have created a situation in which Europe no longer finds itself in a rule-based innovation competition among co‑operative partners. Instead, it must navigate a world of latent antagonisms and, at times, open conflict. To an economic area in which around one sixth of all patent applications result from global collaboration, this presents a substantive challenge. Due to China’s increasingly unequivocal geopolitical positioning and the risk of US policies becoming even more inward oriented, many established economic relations can no longer be considered reliable.

The causes of Europe’s declining techno-economic autonomy

Over the past decades, the paradigm of embedding domestic contributions in international value chains created great benefit for many. However, it also shifted balances and allowed one-sided dependencies to emerge. Many European companies relocated parts of the value chain to oversees locations, including research, development, piloting, and high value-added production activities. Hardly any domain of established value chains has remained unaffected. Both businesses and policy-makers assumed that, in a global community of good-willing partners, (re-)location decisions could be taken based on purely economic considerations.

As one consequence, intensive and often one-sided material import dependencies have developed, most prominently on China. At the same time, Europe remains deeply embedded in international corporate networks dominated by non-European firms, e.g. by US corporations in the digital and the healthcare domain.

Meanwhile, dynamically growing nations in East Asia have strategically leveraged the outsourcing of manufacturing capacities from Europe to build their own, by now technologically leading competence clusters around them. Moreover, these and other countries have independently built competitive capacities in novel technology fields, such as artificial intelligence, through many years of investment in education, research and development.

The current challenges to Europe’s technological sovereignty should therefore not be misread as a short-term consequence of sudden geopolitical shifts. They have deeper roots. In essence, they are the consequence of a longer-term, market-driven process, accompanied by a political paradigm of non-intervention in economic processes.

What is technological sovereignty?

Despite the shock caused by China’s political repositioning and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, technological sovereignty is not a defensive concept. It has to be understood as nations’ independent capacity to shape relevant developments in science, technology and innovation – and to valorise them economically. Thus, technological sovereignty is primarily the privilege of those holding higher ground with regard to capacity and competences.

Being technologically sovereign means to be capable of meeting the needs of one’s constituency in self-determined ways, without undue reliance on others. These needs can be manifold, ranging from national security to local value creation or social needs, e.g. in the healthcare domain. In this light, the ability to develop novel and relevant solutions is a more important policy objective than control and freedom from detrimental external influence. Preferably, such strengths can be developed together with other nations. At the same time, however, they also provide the indispensable basis for more autonomous development, should that be necessary.

Despite difficult circumstances, global collaboration remains not only economically advantageous, but an important source of knowledge and ideas for domestic innovation. It also provides access to much needed human capital and locally unavailable skills. Only in a few select areas, such as encryption or telecommunication, national security considerations now seem more relevant than these direct benefits. In all others, a balanced approach is required – as every collaboration that one renounces to mitigate geopolitical risks will automatically also deprive one of ideas, inspiration and commercial opportunities.

The aim of a more sovereignty-oriented innovation policy is not only to hedge the risk of supply chain disruptions, as it might look from a pure trade policy perspective. Instead, it focusses on investments into domestic capacities and on orchestrating the domestic system more effectively. Primarily, a sovereignty-oriented policy should seek to guarantee a certain degree of functional integration along the domestic innovation chain, while also ensuring that critical creation and manufacturing steps remain part of the domestic innovation system.

While complete autonomy is unrealistic, a stronger and more systemic domestic anchoring of innovation processes is the core objective of such a policy. In addition, an appropriate degree of domestic decision-making autonomy is needed regarding the steering and strategic capacity building in domestic companies. Technological sovereignty cannot be achieved by working with foreign subsidiaries alone.

The way forward: focussing on capacity and competence

Importantly, technological sovereignty does not necessarily depend on relocating production capacities back to domestic locations, nor does it automatically imply economic autonomy. Many production activities could only be shifted back to high-wage environments at considerable and permanent cost. Instead, a prudent ambition for the coming years would be to reposition Europe’s innovation system so that it once more sets globally relevant impulses and standards on its own terms.

In addition to direct innovation policies, including subsidies, this would require a more enabling regulation, greater efforts in technology transfer, rebuilding competitive public infrastructures, and structural reforms in education – in short, increased attention to all those areas where Europe has insufficiently kept up with its global competitors in recent years. Even if the geopolitical situation does not deteriorate further, such investments would empower domestic actors to drive change and rejuvenate the innovation system.

That said, neither the risk of a breakdown of European-Chinese relations comparable to that with Russia, nor the risk of significant transatlantic rifts are now purely hypothetical. Neither of them is imminent, but they have become realistic scenarios. Since technological sovereignty can only be achieved gradually over time, key investments would have to begin now. Without them, all short-term efforts to retain autonomy in the event of crisis would remain fruitless. In addition to investments in education, these include attracting foreign experts to the domestic innovation system, building more demonstrators and pilot lines, investing in automated production technologies to enable reshoring under high-wage conditions, and opening additional production sites that could serve as a nucleus for future industrial clusters.

A European challenge requires European solutions

These goals can hardly be achieved within the limits of a single nation. In most of today’s relevant key enabling technologies, even larger European nations contribute little more than 2.5% to the global patent activity, and even Germany rarely exceeds 7-8%. After the end of Europe’s former strength in many dynamic fields, collaboration has become even more imperative for European nations.

While reforms in basic and higher education may be best pursued at the national level, European coordination will be indispensable in innovation policy. Despite all challenges, new European platform initiatives such as GAIA-X send the heartening signal that even visions of a “new Airbus” should not be written off in Europe. Furthermore, tested models of public-private partnerships for innovation at both the European and the national level can be built on, learned from and extended. Finally, Europe’s spin-off ecosystem – which is better than its reputation – would gain further momentum if supplied with targeted funding.

Despite an increasingly difficult global environment and a noticeable relative decline in importance, Europe still displays a high level of competence and is home to numerous globally relevant centres of excellence in science and business. Promoting these more actively will be the central policy challenge of the coming years – and the prerequisite for maintaining technological sovereignty. In some cases, this will also require tough decisions against supporting other activities in order to provide sufficient resources for those that are considered absolutely essential.

Photo: Fraunhofer ISI

Henning Kroll

Coordinator of Business Unit Innovation Trends and Science Studies, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI

Myriam Mendila: Biotech needs a stronger risk-taking culture

This interview was first published in the 2024 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

Dr Mendila, mRNA was the technology of the moment during the COVID-19 pandemic. Today, there is talk of mRNA vaccinations against cancer. How far away are we from that?

mRNA enabled the rapid development of effective vaccines during the global COVID crisis, highlighting its immense potential in infectious diseases and beyond. Research in cancer vaccines has been ongoing for over two decades, but success has been mixed, and these therapeutic vaccines have yet to demonstrate clinical benefit in confirmatory clinical trials. Recently, encouraging data for mRNA-based cancer vaccines has started to emerge. These vaccines have been tested in various clinical settings in patients with early and advanced cancer and demon­strated immune responses associated with clinical benefits. The concept for applying mRNA in cancer is very similar to infectious disease vaccines: The mRNA cancer vaccine encodes proteins specific to cancer cells, teaching immune cells to recognize and destroy them. Early data, though often from small patient groups, raises our hope that we can overcome the challenges of cancer vaccines with mRNA technology in the near to midterm future. This potential breakthrough could revolutionize how we approach cancer treat­ment, offering a new avenue for targeted and effective therapies.

There is a lot of excellent biotech research in Germany and Europe. However, the risk capital often comes from the USA. Is that a problem for us in Europe?

Access to excellent biotech research and outstanding academic science in Europe is a strong catalyst for our industry. However, access to capital is governed by different factors. The ability to tap into the capital market is easiest via a stock market listing, and for biotech companies, a US Nasdaq listing, with its historically strong technology focus, means the company is placed alongside relevant industry peers. Statistics show that US investors mainly invest domestically, but European investors also predominantly invest in the US. Culturally, the willingness to take risks and engage in opportunistic buying and selling is generally higher in the US than in Europe. This is particularly relevant for biotech, a dynamic field where investors must balance the risks of partially validated technologies with the blue-sky potential of transformative breakthroughs. A stronger risk-taking culture is an important factor why the US continues to lead biotech activities in the capital market.

The business of biotechnology has lean periods and is subject to fluctuations. The German government has a 13 per cent stake in CureVac. Is the state the more reliable investor?

The business of biotechnology companies indeed experiences lean periods and fluctuations due to the high-risk, high-reward nature of the industry. During the COVID crisis, the German government made a significant investment into CureVac, supporting the need for safe and effective vaccines and demonstrating a commitment to public health and rapid innovation. This was a unique situation driven by an unprecedented global emergency. But the government is normally not a long-term biotech investor – biotech companies rely mostly on institutional investors who are accustomed to the inherent risks of the industry. The government’s support was crucial during the pandemic to allow rapid progress in vaccine development, and we greatly appreciate this support and investment.

Photo: private

Myriam Mendila

Chief Development Officer, CureVac N.V.

Markus Dressel: Science, innovation, and the return of geopolitics

This interview was first published in the 2025 Hamburg Science Summit booklet.

For a long time, science and innovation have ranged as one policy field among many – and not the most important. While science has always been regarded as contributing to prosperity and, to some extent, informing policymaking, it has typically been viewed as a sectoral issue rather than a strategic priority.

On a budgetary level, this is reflected in the persistent difficulty of raising public research expenditure. While public R&I investments have increased in recent years, their relative share of GDP across EU Member States stood at 0.71% in 2024 – only a modest rise from 0.68% a decade earlier. Similarly, Eurostat reports that R&I accounted to 1.45% of total government spending across EU countries in 2024, again representing only a modest increase from 1.37% ten years ago. Even the countries with the highest R&I ratios, such as Iceland, Germany, and the Netherlands, invest barely more than 2% of their annual government budgets in science and innovation.

Similar observations can be made at the level of policy rhetoric. In EU documents, science and innovation have appeared in sections on growth, sustainability, and competitiveness, but rarely as priorities in their own right. Nationally, too, science policy has generally been treated as a sectoral issue without overarching relevance – as seen in recent election debates in France and Germany that largely focused on other matters, or in the inaugural policy statement of Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, where science received less attention than forestry and agriculture.

In short, science and innovation have rarely featured among headline priorities, despite their acknowledged relevance for growth, security, or sustainability.

The EU’s new emphasis on science and innovation

This perspective is now shifting in light of a changed geopolitical and economic environment. The EU level is particularly revealing in this regard. In a programmatic address to the European Parliament, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently pledged to “put research and innovation, science and technology at the heart of our economy” – a phrase also highlighted in her Political Guidelines and other Commission documents, including a 2025 communication on Horizon Europe, which argues that “now more than ever, R&I will shape Europe’s future”.

The crucial point, however, is not merely the relative weight that the Commission gives to science and innovation, but their role in its overall strategic reasoning. In response to geopolitical instability – above all Russian expansionism – von der Leyen argued that “Europeans must once again fight for freedom and sovereignty”. These, she stressed, “depend more than ever on our economic strength” and “on our ability to compete, innovate and produce” – a chain of logic that directly leads to science as a driver of innovation and as a prerequisite for global competitiveness, defence capabilities, and geopolitical autonomy. Taken seriously, this establishes a perspective in which science and innovation no longer feature as sectoral issues, but as key assets tied to Europe’s most important strategic goals.

Science and innovation in recent EU flagship reports

This new perspective builds on a series of high-level strategic analyses, particularly those by Mario Draghi, Enrico Letta and the expert group led by Manuel Heitor. The Draghi report highlights R&I as a main driver of prosperity, stressing the strong link between R&I investment, productivity, and overall well-being. It also argues that the importance of R&I will grow, driven by the challenges of global competition and an ageing population. Importantly, the demographic aspect refers not only to the fact that a shrinking labour force must be offset by productivity gains if Europe is to maintain its level of economic wealth; it also highlights the need for substantial productivity growth to sustain Europe’s welfare systems as large parts of the labour force retire within the next decade – a development with profound implications that underscores the systemic, as opposed to sectoral, importance of science and innovation.

The systemic relevance of R&I is also a motif in Enrico Letta’s report. Letta famously calls for broadening the established freedoms of the European Single Market – the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital – to include a fifth: the freedom to “investigate, explore and create without disciplinary or artificial borders”. Letta’s fifth freedom covers several areas, with activities related to science and innovation – such as open access, shared research infrastructures, and researcher mobility – standing out as particularly important. As Letta puts it, this means placing “research and innovation drivers at the core of the Single Market, thereby fostering an ecosystem where knowledge diffusion propels economic vitality”.

The Heitor report reinforces this view. It argues for a whole-of-government approach that aligns science and innovation with the EU’s overarching agenda, treating it not as a silo but as a cross-cutting lever for the EU’s strategic goals. It proposes a stronger framework programme for science and innovation, characterized by clearer political ownership and simplified, faster financing instruments. Crucially, the report develops this argument not only against the backdrop of rapid technological change, for instance in artificial intelligence, but also in view of the changed geopolitical environment. In the authors’ words: “In a more conflict-ridden, unstable and rapidly changing world, it is investment in research and innovation that will ensure Europe’s future security, strength and freedom”.

Science in an era of geopolitical rivalry

A common theme in these analyses is the importance of science and innovation given the geostrategic and geoeconomic landscape. Among the many challenges this entails, three stand out: competitiveness in key technologies, technological sovereignty, and civil and military defence.

Regarding competitiveness, it has often been remarked, with some irony, that Europe is content with regulating technology, while actual development in fields such as AI, semiconductors, biotech, or batteries takes place elsewhere. Private investment in the EU remains far lower than in the US or China – about 1.5% of GDP compared to roughly 2.6% and 2%. Europe is caught in a “middle-tech trap,” sustaining strong regulatory and scientific capacities but struggling to translate them into technological leadership. The result is a lag in patents and market shares, especially in information technologies and advanced computing. This weakens productivity growth just when it is most needed to confront demographic change, limits the creation of high-value jobs and industries, and ultimately erodes prosperity. Addressing these issues is clearly more than a sectoral task: it is a central priority that hinges on science and innovation.

A related concern is Europe’s limited technological sovereignty and the resulting constraints on strategic autonomy. Despite some progress, Europe remains heavily dependent in several fields of technology, including software and cloud infrastructure. Over 70% of the EU cloud market is controlled by US firms, with similar dominance in operating systems and software services. Given the centrality of these technologies, such dependencies weaken Europe’s position in global negotiations and create risks of coercion. At the same time, the lack of competitive European alternatives in frontier fields such as AI limits Europe’s ability to project principles like privacy or transparency into emerging tech standards. The result is a shrinking space for political manoeuvre, both in defending strategic interests and shaping normative principles. On a more positive note, however, it also shows that Europe can strengthen its autonomy if it reinforces its scientific base and translates it more effectively into key technologies.

A further dimension concerns the nexus between technology and security. The war in Ukraine has exposed Europe’s dependence on the US for key defence capabilities, from intelligence and satellite surveillance to missile defence, long-range strike systems, and drones. Many of these are only rudimentarily available in Europe, or absent altogether. At the same time, resilience in civilian infrastructures has become a major concern. Russian hybrid operations have revealed vulnerabilities in energy grids, digital networks, and communication systems. Military and civil technologies are thus deeply intertwined: cyber-security, space assets, and secure digital infrastructures are as central as conventional weapon systems – and all hinge on science and innovation. The lesson is clear: if Europe is to enhance its security, investment in R&I is not optional, but a cornerstone of its geopolitical strategy.

The way forward for science and innovation policy

There are signs that this insight is beginning to translate into policy. The EU Commission has proposed a €175 billion budget for the tenth Framework Programme for research and innovation (FP10), which is set to succeed the current programme, Horizon Europe, in 2028. This would nearly double the current €95.5 billion budget. Under this proposal, FP10 would form part of a broader €409 billion European Competitiveness Fund (ECF), which pools investments in fields such as energy, biotech, digital technologies, or defence. While FP10 remains largely stand-alone, a sizeable share of one of its four pillars would be allocated through the ECF, reflecting a closer coupling of science with industrial and security priorities. At the same time, Germany’s new government aims to raise total R&I investment from currently 3.1% to at least 3.5% of GDP by 2030 – not highly ambitious, but a step in the right direction. France, in turn, has launched its France 2030 plan, mobilising €54 billion for areas such as energy, semiconductors, or space.

As it stands, uncertainties remain as to whether Europe and its Member States will continue, or even intensify, the efforts outlined in these programmes. What is clear, however, is that the view of science and innovation as one sectoral concern among many is no longer tenable. They must be recognised as a central field of policy, with major implications for Europe’s economy, welfare systems, global competitiveness, defence capabilities, and strategic autonomy. Achieving this requires balancing scientific openness with political steering, and fundamental research with its translation into technological application. Ultimately, Europe’s prosperity, security, and self-determination will hinge on its ability to turn scientific strengths into strategic capacity.

Photo: Claudia Höhne

Markus Dressel

Programme Director International Science, Körber-Stiftung